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34»nt years I*ve brought a relatively new tern t» currency in
aoedeealc end political elsenesiGzi* 'Ms tt- ational Stat . alley,"
Is « »ny—Imt general ited hsadiiig for all of those activities ehioh have
ae tbair objective the ar. *s mfe%#
Sbft increasing currency is a result of an increase in the mnrtisr of factors
the world enviroramt iniaioal to that safety, ft* ascendancy of the
national 1ofansa is taost probably the result of recognition of the fact
>. that objective*




tial to the 1
.
i
study has of cor

irsplexien" fctloasJ o ocuaplex nature of the prob-
lems and the breadth of o a comprehensive :
undertaken of all of i&e aspects of such poliey. Hie necessity arises
for isolating and exaai- specific aspec atiooal Security Polls
The aspect selected for examination has been the decision sal rooess
as demonstrated in the field of weapons eclectic .
In one respect such a selection of area might be considered as
actually reflecting two fields. The problem of decieioa-caaking has be
to develop a literature in its own r t reflective of increasing aoadeaio
attontioa to this very basic element of hunan activity. :co decision-
xaakln,; is a basic hicoan activity it has recoive-i attention from several of
the aoadandc disciplines, and sannot be classified as exclusively within
the province of any specific one* Inasmuch as decision staking is a human
process « have an objective, tlie nature of .w aay
determine the validity of specific disciplinary interest as usush as the
process Itself* itfa ro^ari to tho process as an isolated husan activity,
its study would probably be mast appror Ly assigned to toe realm of
the
. ly is concerned with the process in relation to
a specific objective! the i of selecting weapons.
Weapons sole recess carried out in support and iraplsnsfi-
tation of railit lioies. These military- polieies are subsidiary aspects
of ! ational Security Policy. In this manner the relationship of the decision
Baking process to National Security Policy is revealed and the s z*ity
of the study established. The decision sa roeess est: e ex-mined
independently of an o aoision.

ox» specific aspect of actional
has not been narrowed to aana^e-
able proportions. In order adequate attention to the relevar ors
aay be it is further necessary to delineate one le of
weapon for detailc he instance seleoted for this pur-
pose has been the question of the '£ -70 "Valkyrie" boiaber
program.
cxftg^ned will be t ose sou- In a par
tiiae span. The study will c « decisions raade
(jhc administrati en mm»&y as reflected in that adsinis-
tration's reooaaasndatiozis for amendment of the fiscal year 19& bud :ot. In
sr it is possible to oonoentrato upon one single decision, rather
than a series of decisions spooning the entire history of the project. The
history of the project, including past decisions, will be £iven, but
for tribe purpose of pr>- ie oaek^rouad against which the speciflo
decisions under consideration were :x.
t, the specific purpose xoay be suaasarised as the examination of
a partioular decision relating to the Lem of weapon selection. A more
^;.-ow$ mq be fratcc1 M lbs flwulflpmiti of an eppreeiatioa of thi
;;:.... - ::. .-. .
.
:',-. pro L«bh of ational Security olioj throu :. the
detailed stw. ne of its aany aspects.
ortance of the Sfrady
the central position of security to the conduct of national affairs
has previr. >sen motioned* Both -the students and practitioners of
government, intern dona, diplomacy, eeonosr/, end the military

uarts and sciences, to name but a few areas, oust remain constat
fetal problems of seour ..eyond this awareness they oust manifest an
understa &tf the basic aspects af the • . veral v
have pointed to the increac. olose rel ship -which must be main-
i
twined between military poli
furbher pointed out that perhaps the military of z have
Manifesting a rf national
:ioy than have their c, ries ij ts
suococ :g the military aspeots of that policy.
is in fact the case, then a etu e con be of value in that it
makes available in some detail information pertinent to one particular
segment of the military component of National Seour Hoy*
-. area of iiiterest may be broadened to ino iude t
observer who, t3 -i* may not carry responsibility for the axecv..
of security policy or be engaged in scholarly attention to the s
still displays an active interest in the conduct of his ^overnuent. From
this study such an observer may gain an insight into the man w
that lur/;c portion of the federal budget allocate:? to ti estab-
lishment is expended for hie etlon.
. ily, a study such as this c of value
i ,:£ -
.
-.-. :-j--.i a.i J;icG re--. A irs then fee «Qg*£f Ui ssssi art of ti I
nomas K. Finlet ower t >licy« The extensive num-
of works in a similar v eludes a detailed listing her - For a
review of those works referred to in the preparation of





aetlvi iidor review heroin* As in any other profession th .ary
imxi often finds himself so ba3et by I - '.« of details ax
exclusive ooneera with immediate problems pertinent to
«s»t, that it i« with lost
rev j iy such as this -will be of as great a value to
sional mill" iticner as to lite student if it hslps in redefining
the broader reals of ey*
tations of t :dy
o study has beer, subjected to two broad olasse& iions*
In the first class are external limitations which have been imposed by the
nature of tits stud • . oreaost of those limitations has been that which
results from security considerations* ot details concerning the D-70
bomber naturally fall within the category of military secrets. 80 too do
man, is strategic factors which fons part of the basis for the decisions
rendered* Yet this lias not been a severe limitation* If anj , an inves-
&tor might be surprised at the extent of info relation avails'
both American weapons and strategic plamsi
A second form of external limitation might be expected to result from
the novelty of the topic* The termination of events *«
stance of the study precede the compilation of the report of the study by
a very short time period* This limitation is overcome by stc
premise to th© conduct of the study, wh : cor-
rectness of the decision is not under investigation, £&erely the
the test of time as to the adequacy or inadequacy of ' -is-
ls not pertinent* i'or would a revision of the decision at some future
.
date affect the validity of the st , on instance would uher
isoision soade under another set of oireisast&nees. This study is concerned
iy with the decision as reflected in as relative to the fiscal year
.0 span limitation is partially a self imposed ens sad leads di-
rectly to that oat tation. In addition tc ..n of the
study to a particular period in tiae, r ©elf impoa ma are
necessary to ksiep the study withi:. ate bounds. It any bs pointed
at the erect ations is paa .s.rly appropriate in any
study related t oy. As has been mentioned earlier
the field of security oolioy tends to reach out and invest almost every
aspect of national life* Such an all-encompassing attribute tends to permit
easy diversion from the sain poin
.
.ivesti, and encourages we.
from that point into other and interesting aspects a obicm.
a is a temptation which must be resisted final1 ra and eohtrsne*
of Hie study are to be miatained. further limitation© mentioned will il-
lustrate but a few of the distractions which must be avoided*
Aside frost the question of limitation in tiaas, the first self
limitation which jauat be observed regards teohnioali'ty* This is not a
technical analysis, either of aerodynamic practices or military tactics.
The technical aspects of the 1>70 are delineated only to the extent neces-
sary to fera an appreciation of the capabilities of that aircraft adequate
to support the study. Xhe sexa© reservation applies to the technicalities
of military tac . <jy are mentioned, but only to the «&- onsur-
ate with tfae necessity of uaderstaiv" \e strate
:
ations of the
problems involved in deoi 'or or against the B-70 as a w perw
military objectives.

7of the most controversial aspects of any discussion of National
Security Polity concerns budgetai Pool felt laatter
run h , /rgos have boon nmde tfc or balancing the budget
take precede- or the sc. >f the nation.
x
v&r : described as a directed but
ar than military obligations, or simply insufficient3
the economics of defers©, and particularly the itary aep<? .
lea are of the utaost importance
,
a^ain represent a separate
at of the National Sc.. Folic lea. While in a quasi-peaceful
period it is actually impossible to divorce budgetary considerations from
the overall problem of defense, sobs limitation must be imposed to prevent
the study from digressing into a field so lar^e and complex that t fcisJL
question might be lost sight of in the face of the mtaltitudincus fiscal rat*
ifioationa. Consequently, some basis assumptions are required to provide
limitations within ehieh the study zaey be conducted independently of these
fiscal considerations. The assumption basic to this study will be that the
limitations of the defense budget did not actively enter intc -70
question as a primary factor pertinent to the decisions rendered* The tsm
primary factor must be stressed because in this as© of co
expensive sonpem systems cost aspects must of necessity have some beai
eotien. s study assumts that tfce cost factor was not i
*Jsmes . s vi : , v^er and Peace in the Space A^e* p. 170.
. aylor, certain ?ruapet , . % it*
5
i orts, "Report II - Interna' . fey*
Military Aspect," ^respect for America, p. U
.
consideration* That this is a valid assumption is attested • a oast-
saent by ... eoretary of Defense in his testimony before i
riations Suboosasalttee* lieaabers of the sub: .ce <ju. etary
amara at great length on tfe ject. iixeerpti i response give
an indication as to his stand on budgetary lisdtations*
visualise imposing a: y budget ceilings on
the services either during or after the development of their
budgetary requests and budget pr<: . At the same tisar
visualise ver^' tight financial oontrols in the sense that I
want to be assured we a. dollar 1 s sorth of value
for every dollar* s worth of expenditure a very real sense
ttt is 1 to be the of as a tougher control than any-
arbitrary budgetary eeilin^* does not have tiie Sams conno-
tation and same result as ;. at ceilings* The pro-
jals that were presented to Resident Kannedy and the proposals
recosi 3s have been smde wii i-
trary budget oeilings»
• **-*•••#••*•*•••*•*•«•*•••••**•*
• . » I have not been deterred in reeo»riending an adequate
defense program by" bud^et&z
»•»•••••••••••*•»•«••« •.•
x-ust always consider the value we are pro.
ditional strength we are procuring in relation to the coat
sonally would not hesitate to reoo&
itional expenditures if I thought by inereasing expenditure*
wc I increase materially the si is of our milita^
position and our defenses *^
3 study will proceed on the sk that the foregoing qtr
tion presents an accurate description of the relationship of ;ary
considerations to national security in the question under inve.<
-.one for
**
.mi, mil, .,—. .1 , « in inn mm. I' I in ill II >-^ ».V . ...* i in , i- ..i, .— nil , Hi
1962 1 searings before the ©e on a,
se of Representatives* 87tfc t
,
1st Sees** Secretary






suh&wma I on the.
was not aotiwated prissarily by budgetary -.one but rather •
.srits of the weapon as thay ribute to national set1
-efars to accept the premise established
by w '.sKaaa that irreapectiTG of budgetary alloc
;.•:...-.' -
.: :/- -,:. .... of theif aoro la ortant aspects actually t ma Is
decisions*' The pi is one of optimising resources, and it i® of
secondary importance to tfee technique of solution whether these re
are measured iii mtorial, t or aonc
st be set aside as without the
-dew of this study is the problem of the effect of waricua %-pes of
res whioh mi; eat decisions within the federal goverasie
these pressures may be p 1* industrial* or as wried as the aany
special»interost segpaeats which nay exist within a plur
importance .sa is admitted, but the problcss. Is n
iy*
-anisatlonal basis of ;aart»ant of - ei'easo and the Joint
GMefs of Staff are two facets of al Security *w»
to arise in akaost any discussion of that policy,
of t feet of the organisational structure a decision xsakir
joneern itself with the relatiT© efficiency of t
urles , oonoxaios of 3©fense 4a
„ _ _ _ i jai iiirn ohmh iii n i ii i limn »i«i— na ivm .— i i i;. in— I I
-lear A&o» P* 107* - is perhaps one of the best weriEs amilable
which relates the problems of weapons selection to decision asking*
o work is asieally a text on eooiic out rather
the development of a mathod of aaeJ i





•trustors* ash analyses art fy left to the field of saex.
a*nt effectiveness*.
one sad©
stent of ^efens© will be essasdned I s i neeesear
- the Stanly of the decision mej- *?ow*s wit . . fbe
ree of Congressional control of the milltory is not in itself a subject
of the study, but is Esentioaed a© an issue peripheral fee Uw> xaein course
of the investigati
Jeaertauc round Considerations
1 1 m ill HUI'.W— i.»nn.,.*i ,- i
.f i.^i>itt.» ..|JlWwwW.*W.'"^ w» ^wwt.w^wiwW.w.--«—---»*»
The liaiitatlon of the inveetig&tiori to on© specific decision r«
to the eeleotion of weapons pewits a concise treatment of the sain p
of the study* all benefit however, ee -t be obtained from a review
ted to the study of an isolated decision independent of governing con-
siderations • Qonsequently the analysis of the d Be is preceded by a
l
resume of the more important ©laaents of the bee- at mi'
deelsic i be analysed. -a chapter.' I .is thesis are exrauged in
such a oanner that they my provide the reader with a baeie r andlng
of the various relationships pertinent to the problem* The a
ised to fulfill this objective is to with the most generalised ©en*
eiderstions and proceed in succeeding steps to the mor© particular aspects
of the problem* Keen step is designed to narrow the field of investigatioi
i .aer as to penait the reader to arrive at the mac-.





The chapter arrangement of the- thesis is such as to faci,
the objectives outlined above. Chapter II provides a narrative outline
of tho relationships existing between *eouri1$r, strategy, and noli -
e tfaeor vice* a 'basic objeotiv ;ed States policy, is
examined to tho extent necessary to sir understanding of the
I -;essity of axmi- military forces with weapons appropriate to the
implementation of that theory« The strategies of counterforce, finite
deterrence, and limited -war arc listed as the primary approaches to the
aooouiplishcisnt of deterrence* and their iapact on the question of weapons
selection is noted*
the third chapter various categories of decision are delineated
and discussed 1; si on categories were chosen as an a .ate
means of illuetre. lexity of the problem end the ovarii
nature of many of the factors pertinent to wo election* 1 icus-
sion of the various categories se; bo tie together many of the seemingly
independent fields of study or endeavor which in actuality have a very J
degree of interrelationah .
Ghapte : i the problems of determining the :
ance of various weapons in the nation's ar3ejial« This is the probier
determining the "mix.** In an effort to as . ^e res:
the nature of the problem faced by the decision maker Uba advar
disadvantages of the t«D priaary weapons contending for the dominant role






set it apart froa
ular ©oiisldoration ir< J.s* are deti
3ular uniqueness* The h:




t© B-70 ie re-
aeMag process as veil as to provide * resume i
ere of juaportenee In eettia^g the ste^© for the
;ion«
i seen that chapters XX through f have been deej
vend for the exam1net!on of the decision* thai
explored to the est*
tive factors are dm







Mention has been aaade that this study actually enec&pas3<
problestSf those of doolsion aakin;; and weapon selection* It
be sarauaine the history of these aspects of the parobH
ually and 3«.
vision
tihile fcs abi so render ad
attributes of intelligence art
able ior invest: &oal att

tspears to be a relatively recent phrniSMennru *assercar, and
ilondar list f<m works wl we-date 1
eatriea seem to haw written : .! War ***
view of the literature indicates that the field is neither particularly
rioh in source raatori&l, nor do those aoureas display a corsprehensivs
bo the pro bices • It is probably safe to observe that this is
-r 3 ,...-.:! uftims CMJ tod % at bhsn h i a&t .,... o-.er --.'. ?.
work of pre-eminent stature*
jre seeisa to be a ^easral tendency to orient study or discus-
sion of the decision laaking proosss more toward the objective of the
decision than towards the process itself* Consequently* a large proportion
of information available on the decision said: sees evolves as a by
luot of efforts in a wide variety of fields* Ihe current interest in
foreign policy has been particulr oduotive in tfeis regard. Lercfa*
for instance presents an excellent review of the decision sakinj process
in regsJ^ to the formulation of foreign policy in which d<
Q
and policy making sut^o as almost synonymc a tern
field Snyder and PvsTQd o discuss the decision making process in
detail sufficient to render their presentatdor
10
•c or- .:. .1 JSlnSSS ESStt£SSS ~: ITS :;.-. I ; , H tea WVS
Paul *s3orman and Fred 3* 31lander, Decision jhafelae; -
, pass.
erehe, Jr., oeroijn Policy of the jgasrioaia
"" -




well he expected* Jones examines •; eeision making and arrives
at i*it aogent conclusion that the dec • process is
11
stematised common sense. ' Another of the estab-
lished formats for decisis b$ may b© found in jotrin&l alii*
tor is embodied in the "estimate of the ait
which a eojaaander ic taught to base hiji actions. i other
ies which have been listed as portinezit to decision ma
values and ethics, l»adc and mathematics and statis-
is last field has tended to popularise
33
roaoh to the study of dec , although it also mi^ht he
:nd important fieli
1, probably the closest to a study of the dec
ion making prooess as an independent activity with applicability to all
fie endeavor is found in Laswell's work which establishes seven
categories of functional analysis as basic steps in the do
Ikprocess.^
11
Hie fc of an "estimate of the situation" is a military
praotioe of such long standing as to be almost traditional* illlam
liarris, "'JWlilM," ^.vilitary Kevicw,
.
re-
views 1 oeeas and oomludee ''tib&t the estimate is really a mental
check-list and not a do^ma*- He reinforoos the obvious cor
the estimate *t© for reason and stresses the necessity for
h examination of alternatives*
work in this field id
the status of a latter day classic is John von Jeuaan and Dskai n-
stern'; iiavlor * >ee alas • *




'-* Las swell, aision flrpceas t awt* .
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la sussaary it amy be said thai the history of scholarly attention
to the decision zaaklag process Is relatively short and not a&rked by par-
ticularly strong tendencies to treat the process apart from disciplines
already established*
Weapons Selection
As was the oaee with the decision asking prooecs, the -m of
weapons selection is one which also probably enjoys a long but not too
clearly defined history* A« an indication of the antiquity of the problem,
rodio notes that Benjcaln Franklin once took under serious consider©.
.
the question of beer and arrow as a acre effective weapon than the Basket
for the Continental Aray. J v»e xaay feel fairly certain that the basic
problem predates even this early sample by oaay centurios* Xhs practice
of weapon assignment is a more specialised form of the broader problem of
weapon selection whieh is ^sorc or less implicit in the training of all
military personnel. Tide is indicative of the predominant nature of most
of the, work* in the field* which are generally limited to technical imn-
uals of the military services, Throughout the course of history* partic-
ularly in 1&is oeatury the broader problem* of weapons selection imve
occasionally gained the attention of the public* Cat naval race preced-
ing ftoarld War I fc-&s characterised by a significant interest la-
cruiser as an item which enjoyed recurrent public attention* ISore recer'
the battleship-aircraft controversy* and after that, the quest! -36,
*ue sis « Lasswell est his seven categories as Intel
"a'tion* prescription, ';.rwocati.cii, applic ralaal, sad
'Bernard rodio* . . ;. •
. «. -ii» h i ii miM m i .i i inirliiii

are familiar high points of public notice of the problems of weapon selec-
tion*
fortunately, most of the workc ;i£ witk questions
nature tended to • lataios
oao or another fern of weapon without either logical analysis or empirical
1
fftiglMMU
The advent of orLd ;«ar XI was acocaapaniod lay an usodsrstandabls in-
crease in the nuraber of works concerning not only military strategy °^*
also national strate a* charaoter of that conflict was such as to
generate an increasing; awareness of the interdependence of all sectors of
the nation in relation to security. The advent of nuclear weapons me the
primary occurrence whioh focused attention on the speoifi. -ens of
weapons* This device, accompanied by technological advances in means of
delivery, threatened to spread the burden of war over the entire citisenry
of a country* if not over the entire world. Battles were no longer events
Isolated in locale and 11 d bed in effect* Such an eventuality could not
but help to stimulate an interest in wee
rent literature regarding strategy end policy Is abundant* Few
vorks fail to consider the Impact of weapons and the necet
armaments to objectives* let the specific problem of weapon selec
,
not too frequently examined* This is not meant as a criticism, for weapon
selection is perhaps too fins a detail of national security to warrant
extensive attention in most works of a seaoral nature* Shore are, iiowever,
*^'*g** Alexander P. de Seversky, Ylptory through Air Tower.
.
17
exception*. „ .rodie discusses In an enlightened manner the gent
1?
of weapon selection in r. c str.:
provide a.: outstanding analysis of the oecnojaic aspects of weapon seleo-
tic th note the strong similarity between problems of &
strategy which is reflected in the process of weapons select ;iiss:l&~;er
isakes the statement that in the 1960*3 the services will be faced wS
19
problem of selecting from among thousands of possible weapons. generals
Gavin and leylor relate their experiences and difficulties in the execution
of their duties and the inadequacies in United States defense posture to
the decision asking prooess. In speaking of the Bussian success in launch*
lag tits first artificial spaee satellite General Gavin states very specifio*
ally "Our failure was in the aocialon-/jaklng process • • . *°
le these sad other works provide excellent background, they do
not generally engage in specifics as to individual weapons* Current liter*
ature does however, begin to relate the process of decision Baking to the
problem of weapon selection. This thesis is partly designed to supplement
the existing literature by providing a detailed example of the problem
using the 13*70 bomber as the illustration*
.o, 0£. clt. , p. 175 ff« aa- HsKean, loo * •**.
onry A* Kissinger, j <uoloar Yoapcns . 2I4.*
.ng of an overstateaent, a ehs
general nature of the entire work. Though the reader may disagree with
the general tendency to overstate problems and the relentless tendency to
pursue theoretical logic to the point of overlooking ooasaon sense, the work
is nonetheless an important contribution to the literature of strategy,
defense, and foreign policy.
00. olt
. , p. 1 /lor, 00 • clt « , devotes an entire
chapter to this point. Set slora*£mking
•




With the exception of occasional referenco to the d ress to
:j©r itens dealing with current historical si . -riiaery
reliance for source saaterlal was placed upon the official publication* of
the United States Congress* In regard to the ex,. oat of the
administration's decision la regard to -70 and the justification end
explanation of that decision, the records of the hearings before the var-
•.ruse and Senate Appropriation* and Anaed Jervieos eueoosmittscs
serve ae an excellent source* in fact, considering the tiae relet
ehip of the deelcien to the preparation of the thesis , they were probably
tiii© source material then available* ivoparts of various suboomaitlooc
conferences, and investigating bodies also provided surprlsi
source material* In particular, the Senate i-'reparedness Investigating
ooaedttee's report on the B-?0 program probably still resaaias the
21
Single aeet important unclassified accusant available on this progr
: ly do the Congressional publications furnish excellent mater-
ial for this thesis, but a word about their value to the ave>
of national Security * olioy aigat be appropriate. ®ven a brief review ef
one hearing before a Bouse or Senate eons-Alttee concerned with military
js will jarovide an excellent insight into the formulation of
policy, the issplexaent&tlon of strategy, and the neohaaies of operation of
the armed services* They also are of great worth in their illustrations
of the actual functioning of the democratic .processes in relation to tine
raaintenanco of those armed services*
r sore deta i -vapter « infra*
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technical and professional journals have been consulted in the
aeroaaatical, military* end political science fields. citation of those
sources however* has not bean exterisive. i-rimari i reference has
been used to expand upon material origimlly extracted from the priaary
sources, ihe daily press has already been lianti one.-
.
utlliz of aa'. id in a Tory iv.v popular aa_
:
asia©s has been
made, but such instances are relatively rare and generally 2
ticularly unique viewpoint or interpretation of soxas basio a
V. i 1 t * •
The procodural sael Lised in the preperat
already bee .ssed to sosis extent in Sections 1 and II of this
Chapter , and are generally self-evident from the organ iaatioa of the work*
Basically, the process has been one of seekinc out pertinent informs
through a review of the major source material, extracting and preewat
that raaterial in a logical manner. The natorial oontained in Chapter VI
does represent some analytical process* but act of a critical nature. It
must be remembered that the major objective ot the work is to present the
line of a apeoific decision, not t tioism of the validity of that
decision. Finally* many of ttu conclusions contained in Chapter ¥11 are
inductive in nature , and generally limited to fairly cbvic
j^,,":ioarct Qeneraliti dons r. tat I LMwar; sad tea '- /lie .

nterest, public and aoad, In questions of national
security is easily . The several tions" 1 ;sanif«
twe. orsfront ind- j.s and otaents alike Pieces
of radical read j cs in outlook a a certair: . my* of l:
*q or experience of a raodern, war,
iaeniind ms allowed little respite : rs of it
had perforce to face the realisation that the war had set I ^as
permanently and had spawned msaerous new ones* These newer ^<u were and
result of L , changing power i
imbalances and other radical charges which, if net generated war at least
seamed to hers had their period cf incubation great! alorat
. have the pos b«*war years shown a ,mse that their char etic
of rapid and radical change are evolvi
fro oiid e; 3 forces whose interact i v.
and pred:; be e: international tea
fat \«rld horiEons and threo m of i ri
these problems.
a tern 3d as - a for aspect i
oee occurring in this par
of history. ioally, bo of t est si^nifie
icuJ , thi . on of rising expec % t d the evol of




ooix an advancement t
to intensify fch :•tarns of nufleind •**
The xaany . i today vjould Inde
for an . tt i two foots of i sth-
oev md out in sharp relief—the cold war and nuclear weapons.
Etttr represents the co cm of two politioal entities peculia
, the continent m», successors to the nation-states .- -se
two powers has arisen a rial tension*- in Twhich the more or li odict-
able power rivalri further complicated by ideological considers-'. . of
jmgnitu.1 .•« The second faot of raodern life—nuclear vfe&pom,
axta to t ;vrer and ideology confrontation a oritioality -which could
ore exists a broad ran^e of contemporary writings 035a: in detail
oircuiBstanoes, which arc only baroly su^ested here, fron which the re-
searcher may select specifics works a :lato to his needs* One of the best
source altered lias been the c ^n of studies £'.
delations stee. See . 8, Cc '.enate, ! nitcd States Fc
Compilation c 3* 1-8, ^ee on it ions.
,
:
*, and 3. Res. 250, 06th C< 6th Cong.
Sec .. yols. { eroafter referrc t Fort. todies * ) In par-
ticular see The . id Industrial Hesearc idy
ldwide a .conoiaio i'robleijs and xlieir Xiapaot on the Foreign
iicy oi nford Rosea: . —
itary Scient rrelopaents and tfai . on
Fore: roblems of The .siter of '^r^
fnivtrs . , . - - ents in
jy Technology a act on United States Strategy and Foreign
Icy" j Center for International Affai Tersit
Ideology t n Affairs" 1 ana. for International studies,
institute of Teohnolo o» 12—Ecc-noa Lfcioal
Change in the t/nderdeveloped Countrles and Its Implications for Unite
-ioy,"
3
Tho concept of a continent • :e as a successor to the nation state
is X ithau, 1 titles, p* \
k
I dries £e Vi ssoher, ri:eor^f and Reality in





conoeivably destroy the social fabrl ankind as it is now knot
;:, through • :ls of tho cold war ar loar boiat? atten
has been ooncentratoci Mm question of security an its
, Indeed there are those who ssaintain that tho basis Tor the oold
war is aotu- interpretations be jss&ej- of
6
aeourity. Whatever the validity of that ar^tuaent, the faot r«aains
security has taken on novr dissensions ml. .ant of nuclear we*
has see-: acreased in importance, but new means to its attainment
must b e destructive c of atoraio weapons ha
7
of some -writers ©ado all-oufe war an impossible instrument of rati
lith -war a less practical alternative, aspects of rc 1 aotivit
temidered without the? purview of a nore nsrrc f national security
now are encoaapassed within that tern* 8* it is that economic, social., and
psy< cal factors now intrude into a field which was at one tlias con-
sidered primarily the concern of military endeavor*
In oonaoque m relevance of strategy and policy have oorae into a
an :..'•. -cv la kht Uterator* of tea pol UeeJ mi ailifeery fleles* M is
aspects of nuclear war have been examined by severa|
authors. 3!wo of the acre provocative yet restrained works are i'red » le*»,
jt of hoaafc Seatruotion and Harrison and Jssme "3,
ty "of id l>e noted however that not all researchers acceptuni
ii-'let do outlook o >s of nuclear war* ;>ee part
ul*. • iaan Kahn, .. " liermonuclear v?ar, mp» I
6 instei C the - 'lOh*
7
* - J - ioar Weapons and iorottp. ^olioy 3 pp. 1-&,
This work is cited particularly in view of its critical cxaaiaation of both
sides of the ion and its ramifications. ssoellerit analysis ca
p based his str advocacy of limited war, that advocacy ia




not within tlie scop© of this thesi. j in detail the relations
political and military sirat< « ia important to ae uro
is a bond - i o in a modern a^e «fttieh if it docs not i
indivisible at least readers the dividing line of tko two fi ndiscern:
at best. Kissingsr has presented hi* readers with a eoneiso and insert laden
descri *tion of ths relationships existing in his stateaoent that Hit is the
task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy."
is thesis is oonoernod with a very narr
.
jont of t ation-
ship referred to above. Specifically, the concern is with the sol of
Biij
.
bools iwiieh aro one particular fom of the physical manifestation of
power* This thesis proposes to trace the decision Baking process in the
selection of one particular weapons systen. Prerequisite to such a study,
however, is an adequate understand - the intor-relationshipc of the various
aspects of strategy, security, power, and polioy* Thus this chapter is desi
to trace out (but only in detail sufriciont for a basic understanding) those
relationships as they bear upon the laroblesas of decision making in weapons
selection*
I. F • L CKAX
Essential to an understo:
.
of the problems fas
in questions of national, security is an appreciation of two fundaiaental c
in the world situation* The first is the tremendous power of nuclear weapons.
The second is an essential change in United States vulnerability to ensogr





barriers behind which the Arnei oople enjoyed the opportunity to aooes*-
plish unhampered the construction of a political entity unique in leorld history.
A third ol&uaant of tlio world situation of significant momast, particu-
larly ao in that it represents a conscious ohoioe of a disadvantage rather than
an unavoidable eventuality, is the avowed resolution of the United States
govermjant that it will never strike the first blow in a nuclear war. This
act of self--denial, no natter how laudable from a moralistic point of view,
< the national planners with obstacles of s
Bast - military Machine capable of destroying any eaemy be eothrived, but it
must bo contrived In such a manner that it is oapablo of absorbing the punish-
ment of a massive nuclear attaok prior to exercising this capabili
II.
The result of the fo rejoins considerations is that Acer loan leaders are
9
sident Kennedy has specifically reaffirmed this dictum for the
fit of both the United States and her allies* In an interview wiv. • it3
reporter for broadcast on British television ^r« Kennedy assured the British
audience that '« . . we will not strike first . . . .n i>ee i'Jews Item, The
Christian ^cienc arch 27, 1961. In outlining basio defense policies
In his message concerning revisions to the defense budget, the President snid
aras will never be used to strike the fir orb blow in any attack." Mm
Congress, ?coGgaond~ Tense -\ge from
The President of the United States Relative to i-ecommaodr/ to Our
jdjtet, House of licpresentativea, '/, : ., 1st 0*
1S5 , si after referred to as Keoommandati ons ^essage , 1961.
)
s tone dted States policy seems to b© a partioularly sensitive*"
possibly because the moral duplications do not necessarily coincide with the
logic of survival* For an example : reseional reaction tc 3-
rfcion of a departure i. t* dictum on the part of a governmental
official see • Jongress, House, Departasnb of ..efonse j -propr:).. for
19&?, earings before ti csamit tee of t he Committee on*
Duso oi 1 tentative ., 1st $oss», 6 parts, Ft» 3* '
.Oefonse, Chairs* 1 ervioe Secretaries and Chiefs of
Staf. - 1 . reafter referred to as 'louse Defense Apprc . Heard
.)

faced -with a task of great complexity and magnitude. In
requirement for the attainment . ate defense establishment they must
respond to continuing dosands that the United States embark on an
10
foreign policy aai cease conducting its affairs on a purely reactive" basis,
Conaiderii^ the strictly military'' aspoots of the -world situation it might seem
that the attainoaat of an adequate defense should be an accomplishment wc
of the most gifted military and politic ill* "onotheless, the demands for
an a^ressive and dynamic policy are not -without validity, I"he world is not a
static collection of states but rather a dynar; ifeiaum of forces, and the
nation which contents itself with a defensive and reactive outlook w. :• a
find itself overtaken by the sociological and pol I forces . which
the most air-ti^ht military dofer.se can offer no proof*
;ic and the law of nature would suggest that any "aggressive" or
"active" x-iicy action by the United States or any other cannot be under-
taken without a firm basis for such action. i is not propounded as a theory
but merely a oossnon sense and logical observation -which would be equally
priate in any field of ixuaan endeavor whether it be milit ~os.
or physical science. In the military sense the dictum of protec your rear
would most probably be an appropriate analog. In the political field it mi
perhaps conform most closely to "negotiating from s h." In general t it is
but another refleotion of tho caveat of build on san .
10Thomas K. Finlet iicy * o 1960»a,
Chaps. IT ami VI. This work is •« nifToant to this discusHS :
thai aines both the need for an aggressive policy and the profo-




- .ited States philosophy for the reso] Leaa
11
is reflected in the strategy °t "deterrenoe, * Alth.
written about the aany facets and nuances of this strc Lt is si£s?ly sumcd
as asking an sassy feel a in Ms on mxm that an a sa the
mtes, no matter how successful, will inevitably re maeeaj
able" retaliatory datx There socaas to be little aj
as to the validity or the objootive- of doterrenes anon imsd writers in the
field of political and military stra . The question o~
attain this objective, and particularly the
ropriate fonts of weapons for iMBt of the neans and the strate
Jiese weapons represent, has indeed stimulated a veritable si
literary (and other) controversy, assive refe j
fore©," "finite de oe,* and "balanced forces** or ed war capability"
hare ru lied acadenie* political, and military pa
the country's peacetime history have its oitlsen* found
11 >....., aof t




• ^ram," p. 1, (Here* xl to as the JW£ iJ!E2££ ^r*
renoe is des- i mill
tis de is a synthesis of the ic writers
reviewed* It is perhaps most closely allied to the def
. >* I reader bo
is definition. oferenee to the saaah
nature of the .' ages and .ith




strat; .-cposition available for their consideration. "
ociation of the problems to be resolved in the process of
decision making in the field of -weapons selection requires at least a basic
understand in^ of these theories of deterrence* Consequently it appears neces-
sary at this point to outline the essential elements of each theory*
Poe the most familiar theory, at least in its title if not in its
total stmt is is that of "massive retaliation.
"
term is
attributed to the late John Foster Dulles, formerly Secretary of State in the
nenhowor administration. Speaking at tih© Council of -tions in
1951). .Dulles made note of tfee necessity of reinforcing local defenses with "the
further deterrent of massive retaliatory power." The speech also stressed the
necessity for the free world to be able to "respond vi es and
with means of its own chocsin . The speech reported that this was a new
national policy resulting from "basio policy decisions'' s National Soourity
Council. The essence of the decisions, he stated, ... was to depend pri-
marily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of
our own ohoosin « lies himself stated that the purpose of this decision was
to preclude the necessity of having to try to meet the enemy's choices"
and rather to select America's most significant military advantase and fashion
strategy and policy around it*
* " iSLjL* Tho shoGr aumbsr of recent works in this field precludes
practical enusaeraid on a^; . is reader is referred to o-
ihy for a listin ioso \jark cons - "
of periodical literature one o most widely cited and capable analyses is
..-ilstetter's, alanoo of Terror, 1' Foreign Affairs,
XXXra (January-, 1999), pp. 211-23U-
Ik jorted in The Saw York Times, January 13* 19f&»
J iB
m
The Secretary pointed out that such a strategy permitted more sec
"lea, **.» ottar^ =a. m tto trad^tteo of thi, doetrfa. a
of the costly end unpopular strategy of the Korean "polios action." In
inter'-- years criticism so has not been 1a i./
ally, it has boon pointed out id been & j viisn ths Unite
.00 had lost iiie nuclear advantage -anion provided the basis rationale for
euoh a policy* Critics farther noted that sueh a doctrine lacked the flexl:
required to adapt to the varying Isvels of cballonrc virion an enemy, particulat
one u±th the i and other advsBSS^ss shioh are Russia's., slight pose*
o the many attacks upon it zuassivo retaliatic proven a dur-
able doctrine* While the limitations of iaassiv« retaliation as an operational
aspect of policy appear to havo boos- f yell expounded , the implication of
extensive national destruction which -the tern embodies remains still the
esseiac y the., deter
i
So labile massive retaliat have
been discarded as tho ma^lc ;oae of cheap and painless eontairaaent its
rit endures as the substance of those deterrent policies contrived to con-
strain the eruption of all-out nuoiear "war.
At cne risk sg ths obvious it is perhaps vri.se to note at
this point that in any discussion of deterrent str phies
is essential to boar in mind ti» fact that deterrence is neither an absolute
nor oonstaxxi uxreuastonoe, but rather is a relative and voriabl: .;nmnon.
Because it depends so mush upon the mind of he -who is to be deterred, deterrent
15
cit*, pg^ cl. •
j Sg« i «..,. ...:..). \
•
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p>lls>»l iff ra-i-. .'i c' ;: ,• piyeiv.:/!-, ...-:;
either in the realm of a test of villa or i
minds of various national leaders • Conaequ
quate deterrence iaust be the subject of eon
jastasoec. is con
disc iioh surrounds it.
d ii.o
Table that the fact that
n responsible for the
'alls ahei
IV.
iiaving paid an obeiss
genuflo- saken heed of t
the implementation of the deterrent strategy in the Uni
both "independent* authors and writers in lailitary en
leads the reader to visualise a store or less basically
tetwM . Hm prtponmfri *f ••artktjriflaapae ,-" : :.- its I 4mn
tioaal" or H : ;a?- ; forces.' lines are sel<
lis factor baa been extensively













Forces or with agencies closely associate
instance , are or have been associated vri-
inger has been a consultant for the Open







for Choice, pp* 27-J|0, presents a
. ly in
to* op* pit *
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paasi















•daily lose sight of the ends which the theory was designed to serve.
on a countor
i-oduoe no ../ cause a deeiro for an alternate and less
r an ins! -lew of the two theories of de j* as
oept eee the testitaoxv r»




PI first two are disc
, I60»6j?. ^oe also, however, a iaore re
attaolc survival r« ....... <r-
dted




if not i ieaiiy by name an early dec
in isoussion of "overwhelsii .'•*
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disproportionate awan . as a re^e he runaway p Lai*
ities of a eounterforco offort, o- as an a a I r military
hardware aero olos Ives the finite date: i >ory
ha* evolved. - xsass i ®re is z cer vi of damn
which is une.c bit to an enemy* Is level of damage can .shed
,o) number of weapons .If
a meor . eviaed to insure the survival and delivery of these weapons
ae natter whet i e enemy may j then that spt number
of woapons (with again, of course, an insurance factor) will deter the enemy
Ire.; a '- ^ . :' .
A aodioum of refleetion wi 11 reveal faults in both of these philos-
as* To mention only a few objections is to indicate the difficulties*
iterforee in and of itself oo'jM stimulate a breakneck arms race and roe
in national bankruptcy* Exclusive implementation of the finite deterrence
philosophy results in a lack of forces to fight a war if deterron ;o si
besides doEianding; the certainty of invulnerable forces—and certainty is not
characteristics of the decade of the sixties* The sicst obvious drawback of
either philosophy is that it eemaits a nation to the doctrine of massive ratal*
iation—only the means for achieving the retaliation are different, and that
difference fundamentally resolves it sol. • quantity and i
fhis 15 ion creates a cor&omitant inflexibility in the nation* of
political activity* A nation is committed to all-out war* As a result there
is no means to oounter enemy provocations of lees than an all*eut nature* Thus
a nation relying exclusi
.
r a counterforce or t :;e doe«
trine renders itself vulnerable to the enemy** istplementation of ager





it acts as a stopper or barrio o ix









will act and on tills level thsJ
aeintenanee of conventional or
power, and extreme aobil: ; ,
oaln nuclear weapons, depend
J
by variant soots of the limits
Lie United war atrat,
to varying degrees of provocate
, the alternative '
s must be oc.-. -,- ,-,*.-
I 3 oonfr
s3




the threat of atonic destruction nor proof against "escalation*"
oa this necessarily brief outline of the more popular theories of
deterrence it should be obvious that there Is no single sola'..
strategy* Specific ti.ro. is remedies. The r
specific remedies leads to the "balanced forces" theory in ml
The term is self-* tivo* On the surfass It Bight seem that a re
objection to tie balanced foroe concept would b© di produce* svhat
be acre logical than a defense establishment planned to counter spec:
2k sad in rei
abl<
use of ever largo
.-
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is adequate if not carried to a:
implement s bro&Lca down afesn. tic .iar si
priori . Le threats -would re* n 1win—
nilitary investaaent. Thar© tho:i ari« jvaluativ
pr- of thv . . - re&t. JPreeiaair. the xaoaar.
a definite 1 to sihat a nat to spend on defense, there is the
danger that i to provide several -weapons the nation ends up v
no single effective weapon. And as one writer has s
there is also the very serious possibility that the aost dangerous is
0*7
also Im least probable* Thus there arises the necessity of threat ei
3 essentially the question of whether it is beet tc
enarv' 3 capabilities or later r to plek seas mic . an if a
the balanced forces is adhered to , liiat ia the i
balance is to be oriented?
Stripped of all side issues and raduoed to the essential elenents,
for represants an outline of the three most popular theories bed
•-.:
-; .-.;,
.c: j.r.n:.:.- . %are are iaJaad a«r1plural :'r ••• -.in-.. . . •' I
questions vhioh oould be explored alzaost iadei ly# But if the knowledge*
able observer Kill loarn 'aell tiio basic factors so far outlined ho will be
-.- 'i ..•--• v./:: tue basic preoisea about i ah Um am^oritr a aoc • '...v.- :.....
arguraant revolve*
lag accepted the strat^^y of detorrenoe as tiie kaystara
States ailltai; ;»hilosophy it is &a task at tiei as liana nakani f&rat • arri'
tents deterreno
.
£, p# l|2#<. 9A
•
:-.
secondly* tc select tkose weapons* those itens of military hardware, -
adequately serve both the cause of dot.:
States. It is skeins © study of the ueetioz
Two quotations, though separated years in . will assist 1
reader in maintaining the relationships between eras and strategy as he pi
further into this study.
The highest type of strategy . s that which so integrates the
policies and araamen .iie na hat the rosort to war is either
rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the asjdiauia chance of
:-Q
dic.j our anas are ant boyond doubt can we be certain
beyond doubt that they will never be employer
Both of these statements reflect the essence of deterrence* Ai
the reference is only ixaplioit it is possibly acre poignant for be
5
years intervening between these two statements have witnessed the advent c
leer weapons* This coning has not changed the nature of deterrence
has appended a terrible necessity for its certain operation.
^^Sdward &cad Earle, Gcrtk . and Felix Gilbert (eds.), Makers
ii ii i i ii * mm*
.)dersi
statement is or in Pre
Address and was repea' of the Union Message to
ate of >** Address of t
of the united Stat Sees./I ,
:v referred to as State oi1 tast? inion 1)

ill
is affec?urn m&cm sku
- a decision to create a new weapons system* we mist -
sider siany thin i • -^aost among them oast be national ni:
.iicy* enemy weapons systems, our resources, our economy and th*
stat© of the techs
. All of these arc variables that occur in
wany combinations in the decision making process.1
General lavin wrote these words against a bat
military service and extensive participation in the d
systems* ioubt his list of factors could be expanded , but it is already «
imposing; recital* A aoaent's reflect oneral's statement will
at least a preliminary insight isrte the extensive nature of the problem in-
volved*
the preeo- hapter tbs relr ' strat
security were discussed. This area is of importance in that it provides the
context or reference which serves as the bac oh other de
ions are weighed* Against tfcat background this chapter rri.il examine t
the nature of weapons systems and deline
categories pertinent to the selection of weapons systems eoEpatible with
national objectives and poll
I*
i* term "Weapons System" has corns into more frequest usage as an
advancing logy has rendered weapons mere complex* Alth
ar and Peace in the Spec
.'
have a saw sound to the la; j& the concept of wsspoiwi systems is not new.
Indeed the tor:.* lies long been famiHa? us ord-
jrity
A wee « 1 with a weapon—is slsiply an entity
.nstroamt of caalx h as an aircraft or missile*
er with all related equipment and supporting facilities required
to the instru&o ;s target or,,to the plaoe -where it per-
foms the function for whs ms built."5
A Mapcn or nc .-. , ;s ,-_y i -a/ asms into being is several Ways.
most eoEsaoa method ie for a military service to deoide that there is a require-
ment for a specific type of weapon sad have it developed* This is by far the
most usual method . In many instances eertain weapons are merely refinements
A particular example nay be apropos. The torpedo has been a standard
naval weapon of this eent . has t .aarines,
torpedo-boats, destroyers, aircraft, and occasionally by capital i et
each vehicle mounting this weapon represented a differ; ua requir-
ing ra Ifferent concepts of attack, launching neohaniams, and fire-
control . fas bas
modifioations aimed at caking it mere ©oropatible vdth the particular system in
3
.MMnAei'- J. - .1 airoa. rooure-
nent iation Committee, in testimony before a Senate corn: . .
C-ongro. mto, Proouroiao :.t-.«iy , «earir.
jee of the Committee -ates
2nd Sees., 2 par •. i, , - ereafter referred to as Togur»«'
.)*
or purposes of si. khs tera weapon will be us
resaainder of this oh. , As used herein "weapon" should be considered
to connote either an individual weapon or a weapon systea» In real am
Inter-relating issylaiHIsi mi Modern ailitary teck:v.lo y tart sue: ... -v,:;.
any item, including tlic individual huzaan being, cay be consiO art of a
•
report of less Iwrc
Arise », United States Senate
^
* — 2nd Sees*,
'ja, w p oreafter referred to as
jeral sources of requiremsats j to ax
aaperienoe of u trieaoe a
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and iaprovesients of e, vices, representing normal teohn:. .1 ad-
vances in araauorrfc and other industries*
On occasion ft weapon may intrude uninvited and uneane-. . li-
seen© apparently independent of nilitary raiuirements « In aoiae respects
the submarine followed this pa- , It might: foe said that in sucii oases the
military airily did not realise that they had a requirement, or perhaps that
they ware not suffiolen. nieant of isiiat marvels the "state of the art
6M eftffthla* Perhaps more fairly there are some oases in which technological
ress, Senate, lane xo Satellite and Missile
Hearings before the Preparedness Inv -ttee oi t btes on
the Armed Services., united States Senate, I 2nd 5
par '.. 1« rafter roforrod to as Senate Satellite and **J3sile
Inquiry *)
"Ibidu, pp* 7'91—0^14.^. gassi... The passage referred to concerns the tes-
ony of"" >
-terlinc U-vingeton, Assistant rrofessor of ftualnsss Aci&inis-
tration at the Harvard Business School. In his testimony > Liv icade
a Sta y\so for the transfer of all basio research to a civilian of
the goverar&ent, basing his reeorassmdation priuaarily on the fact that nilitary
officers by virtu© of their training and responsibility are mor .lth
present readiness than vdtii future potential * lie further support*.: views
by the ecsaplex nature of -leoisioa asking process in the
Sec also l)r» Livingston's article, "Decision Making in Weapons
._.,.
l'._". 1 , Business i&yUm, XXXVI, (January-February, 195Q), pp» L- . - . -
been the only authority to propound this viev?* She hear-
ts! 2,Ul6 pa^as oi' / of military, scientific, iua-
1 experts anent the prolyl ems of weapons developosn
akin to these views* Lest it be assuited that the vier;
3 of like mind stand urcohaJ * rsader's a . .on is irr.
She examination of Dr« Livingston b^ Senators
) and also to a rather strenuous rebuttal by Trite-.
fiavy T s Research and Development i^l-6 ** merits
(he question cannot be argued here, it is important that the reader
aware of the very strong differences of opinion in ox: , to
the is the wa: 1 1 'ficing present readines the




advances laaaifestod In mw weapons created their am r
indeed, the day aa:i first flow there arose a nil oraent for military
aircraft, although the realization of H t have been slow in laemx-
sever i of a weapon, thero is the interestinc fact that
nest weapons contain within -tfieiaselvos the seed of a counter-<wt. -
zasy be inherent in the nature of tho instrument , or in 11
usually in both, ncths fleant f neapoas is their seocr
indestructibility, nc - havir; xirod upon the martial scene a vea
slow in disappec - o patterns of -aarfaro are :
devices frequently enjoy rather surprising renaissance,
e question of armament renaissance is a peculiar one* An old concept
vitalised in response to a peculiar need, or inter ly enough it-. - .
. >orary example of a pot in soarch of a re
it is the HAGKIGlff (Inflatable Rubberised issile and Aircraft)
G**os3, Mouse, ^eparteaent of Defense Appropriations
hearings before the Subcorasaittc
resentativ 7 parts, Pt. 6, ''©sear 3lops*H
Test, a cij" pr - referred to as
J
.£, 3L9&I » ) The testimony provides an interes
into the relationship of technical possibility, military requirement, and
budgetar;/ and administrative practices In r to this question.
be remembered that the United States, the birtl
ht, failed to provide a single combat aircraft in the thsatc oeratic
Id War I.
9
urront central pos i worl j perhaps
the best ease in point
.
spectacular instance is the development- of be
air crews sad ground trc One nay also note tha
tgs ssysnsti sjf still aa important itexa of military proeurti si *
sariags, l$(M , .
«
.
may arise as retorsion by an antagonist to weapons or tac
.-3 mxmnt at louss. ; a regal .
possibly unique to a certain field of battle a suoh as or terrt
often play a leant role, Also, the predominant aspoot of an antagonist's
stron. hi be tibe considerate oh channels weapons utilisation and
development in specific directions*
1 of this is necessarily part extension art qualifier of the
remarks ej receding; chapter* Weaponry is part science and part art.
must be reflective of the national strategy as project future, yet
responsive to possible recro-reasions necessitated by unforeseen end often
unpredictable circumstance of the memorr . . selection in tinae of peace
must be based both, upon past experience and conjecture of the , and
simultane^ it must retain the eapaoity for rapid response tc >@cted end
contingent ohallen c. sera and military lasn alike often speak of their
products as compromises* In the ease of ma^iisM however* the oesqpraBd.se often
extends beyond the juxtaposi ical limits iie
laboratory', drafting t ad loi' . »e responsible military
10
olico action1* is replete with variations on t
Although the example ean be quali.
'
- uad mi
extorsive nt... ion one laay difficulties of a rolat.' rn
armed force against a much ©or© crudely supper « The
a sea and air forces to effect complete int<
.•-tie system is of special interest, i'h© almos
naval forces, concentrating on an old but effective weapo combined
Hie advent; T position and the s&ost primitive of techniques
stalling the United Rations seaborne investiture of onsen for at least a fori
t» b detailed account of naval mine warf&r- the problems
oo£ in oreaa en^a^ement see Arnold £• Lott,





by tho cole ' dor
Of WK9
bastions « I ility
11
A-ror, and on thron of lat. olitio;
Tlk ion of the engineer and tba pol e-milit
33ts gesso of tho baoie divii sfc in the nature oi
tie . . * r'.sions as t 00 ba ;;re arc
a mltitude of facets to the- Isaa of gjeapon so
problem areas gene* 'iio need for a host of deoislo: .,
tho picture is tho fact 1 roblesa areas do not submit to oar ri-
sati 9 . Hasaification is complicated by the overl bare o problem
aroc :ie one hand and an all-pervasive nature on the other* lnd©< oral
-lavin only hinted at the intricacy of the situation -when he spoke d
b occur in many ooinbinat . A delineation of the vari
ope : lly tho catc; adersts
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ufhls particular £i decision sn is boon :aentioned above In
the disotission of the nature of weapon?, is the phase of t.
ulat remezits,. In sewy case roquireraent or need will be
is
obvio ifully obvious* J other ins
As previously noted an exie
or the stiswlus .xiy ocsa© fren a variety of sources* I'oquireeaents
no radical departures frc temporary soiantiiio or engineer!
oveoent require orJy to be er critically fro&i the 6 of actual
need or financial outlay* In an age of
ONI reej UNMafai ftMUtil Jxisici an In seta*! Efcaaibillty*
Perns:'
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The d€ of feasibility requires an of
ire capabilities of science* it also deraandt:
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nebulous cltaraote Ue origin of an idea*
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© dwolepoent of ^ilae and a
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I \/ . r -depend
quo. adjaiaistrativ© organisation necessary to attain marlmm
bonofit from this rei or ia^ortemoo
.
"io-sailita odsted si
conquer be prooet thi
relationship* however , represents a political and «oci
without si ..oaticeis*
t fe&sibili . oiude teohnl
a divic lie between e rrtw is pe
pointy but an awareness of the relationship leads to the
decisions*
tec jions
die si. - iecisions are those of a
upon basic science than upon engines, s) re~
is possible that teehnieal do by
far : g ;;ro.v: ..-J . maaber of areltoeaenti In tho enttn aesdetoa aaki p-vootw









Mtfts. See par irt II, **r
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bo jaaahanio&l or &loe I, one-day ov
nor nxadfl «f it are-
ax as nuclear vs
19
lay.
3 and 1 miiTuxity of t^
14 of \;
i
oars for a mcdor:. voa -- .* -lis lead
b© at* d te 1 a?
fraa adxi itiw draj. . But wiiato .-•
.Tertia^ there is
ing bo-.. . duos
this tixao span Imve boon oat with certain note »«« but Hitnl
load tir.oc aro coeval with growing oonplex Cw
and very extraae enzapla* jnate
j Inquiry 3 p - losoribsc • citation""^ Tdent
lama of organisational atruoturo and their
of this particular subject is .nod in






£°The literature on the %e i and administrative aep
inhe. s is
citations eeeKingXy unlimited* For tbe purposes of this thesis
ils Inquiry and partic-






A awe- to make a I c ! slineatlon arises at this point. This
chapter is concerned with categories of decisions » of which administrative
decision Is but one. Is not" : , great length in ; as cited, the
icienoy of the decision ma:.. J«e is part&oularV sc s© the
administratiye arranges*; . se administv.
an 1 management control. .Mi-
:• areas in the C. , » making process, it is
neoesst avoid the danger of i iverted from the mi: se of
chapter, s the categorisation of types of decision . tdon d
idLth administrative decisions $ not the administrative aspoc the
decision roa ooess. > on is important and r. if
the dit . icate man,.
sational aspects of the administration of national securii ,
Admiral yer will attest to tho importance of the area, and allow restam
of the basic discussion* of the "technological race 5' between the
and the 8evJ m, the Admiral saidi
,j'tween two different ...
1 bote eresi bureaucracies. If we place
asis, if we about a contest between
democracy and totalitarianism, we can get at the root of the L«bb





al to state ttiat complex weapons genart
require tx .
no doubt thf a of the Anaod
repress fioant dimensions*
account for approximately
joct to rai CTieanageawnt very speeific procedures are es-
ted fc r expend!tur . a fulfillment of
a ver
corning weapons* i, either on a cor.
rfciated basis* CapabilH --actors must bo evalu: jIsIods
&ade as to vshether . 3 are lent to persiit the
accompliahwent of the task 021 which he has subedtted a bid* Compiler:
procedure aro certain statutory requirements : & to the amount of federal
expenditu: mist bo apportdono^ ix; snail' .mosses, -sion c
sed 8x003," and 1 fact that publio funds are b ent
for weapons establishes a oompletely separato category of decisions apart from
mo which would be normal in a private endeavor*
resident hennedy for
rlatior. sse.., >e -ort I . .1*
referred to - jo > 'ofens --. - 9 VJ&» )
25
n see Senate 4y « Also see ' «
Study of the Anaed Servicer
tation" *keroto, &oex-ngt be-Tr* rT "~""k~ : " J'jteo ftr Bpeeial itefeotT IVAo. ..3 h
tno CocEaittoe on Arms ,30 of hepres
o-reafter, blouse
Sit.
i:.«J. ; I »H ..nt.. l». l i», , . «. , ., - . . i mii I III I iWll * ^....,J * -

disburses
not the only a is <mt
jos mast I and ao^oiz& ioes v;
25
particular military establishment and the Departeerit of 1
liais^ other services and even isitli ser f
all.:- je of air and spaoo w
•wit. -dlitary ftgcxic nand&to .
meats are to of many other administrative decisions *,?hich stust be
resolved
•
ty hints at ths ©araploxity of tit© admiaistr
problen* Tie very complexity has give: to a very speoicl >f admin**
for sosae parti
prior -.- national need a rogram shall be taioav bite nonaal
adainist:- chain and esta
parent body but •wit - jtresalinsd vrocodures- vy*o Polaris
26
-am wa3 aocoapl fashion. is is a delicate decision,
entities within an or
soon destroy its organisational basis*
Financial
roably no area of taking in relation to national se
en rise to so lauoh di
,
acrimony, and bitterness as has the.
:
.,-. > » .. r -:-:,^, :. i thia field ran; . froia bhs -roc >.:•; *1 v --* •&•• a**i
Senate Satellite and lis Lr . 4«
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i sots or ii&sd ,.-;v
of advances, will rei risii; % are
*:: b i its
3, resulting from scor u
to be an inflat
uoh disoussee
into two major t
in overl.
021* another in rai
roblesas of financial deoiaic
althoi; ^-a ail attempts at siiapl.
many important though subtle nuances of the problem, the first u&jor aspect
is that already zaentionedj how lauoh ean the nation afford? The second aspect
of Ou icm is, either iiidepeudev. ; • in oo
the more oosiples: and saore expensive weapons
,
per se, the best for the national
Is it better to have many good weapons than a lesser ;
most advanced, and theoretically, best? If a limit is oetal
all fisnou.it of funds available, tho problem may require ax
decision* x limitation on funds, weapons must be si
own merits entirely, b competition with other types I
so&lo of finely dovisod priorities*IS
2? raar ease an eaoeell
ability to e them is con
II - International Scour
ically * 5«
for h
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Inasmuch as many weapons represent a spedHe lis* of otrategio thinfc-
colored by service e ~ty, the pos~
sii the Armed Forces
29
should be obvious. * o assume on the basis o:
that under peacetime con;
.
t» can be fear if any decisions uhioh do not
reflect some influence of the financial aspe-
iiMrt&v*1 ooialoma
r a number of reasons, partly because of long lead times, partly as
tits result of the rapid advances being made in science and technology , and for
numerous others such as changing; strategic orientations or changes in Military
tacticg* frequent review of the status of a weapon in the defense scheme is
required.
. a review may indicate need for acceleration of development or
an increase in inventories* It might also indicate the abandonment of a
weapon. In the latter ease the decision racy become particularly agonising if
large sums of money have been spent and major organisational oh
executed to accomodate the weapon. The dynamic nature of forces at work in the
-world ap
:
oar to make adaptive decisions more neoeset ocisions oi'ten
require great foresight, much courage, incisive action* end poc ruthless*
»s. At the very least » aside from these personal characteristics, they re
Uttamol , xho ncertain trumpet, w 115-29
»
specific problem. Particularly entertain:
iiis "Parable of the (nhap argeant,* pp. 12k~&7*
30
In effec . ident Kennedy's instructions to his
an example of this %pe of decision on a lar^e scale* enate
Procurement Authorisation Hearings* 196£ , pr>* I-1?, Specific
rriTrTITTHfl "! Ill *M* III >*— i« W 1 1 i. Ill II ! I! 1.1 | #»l| 1 MMI| »|| 111 .1 I ! JSfa—
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Let it be assu&ed for tie present that a proposal for a weapon baa
progressed through the various categories of decisions eni»aerate&«, Let it ba
further esausaed that in this difficult journey no strictly logical raaaor
the weapon has presented itself, and that significant advantage
of a stratc..;ie nature *dll accrue to the nation through its possession, sfc
not acquis! trio: 3h an instrusaent then proceed forthwith?
idght dictate an unqualified affinaativ©. But there frequently exists another
oatoi-ory of decisions to -s*iioh the proposal must be sutaittoc r lack of a
acre precise appellation let ti called the area of political deciei
it an yd all of those considerations which might tx
ecus
,
liose influence is of significant import YJhen the ultimate decision
Is removed iron the sooswhat narro-;: limits already reviewed end placed e
a broader background* 3 conceivable that seas factor of special Interest
may intrude u iiis head. . ulnrly during the
od of an ele ean color a decision, everal other factors couM be
in this c n It is the store bread co lie vjord
31
political that is intended*
of the most important so lone facing the decision maker is
Id opinion, and in a nan-oner sense, the sassy 's opinion* lenuous
nature of deterrence, ite .1 i sands a
XT
' The reader will remember that --cisioxi to build the hydr
t -tine final sense, a political one,









oeivable tfca asive preparations nay be misinterpreted by the mmty and
•briber the war they have so painstev boon fashioned to deter*^
-tain weapons have traditiorsally carried eui aura of repugnance a
the, rhaps the taoat obvious example is that of p its
it it is no more inhumane, possibly loss so, than other weapons*
*ot wrld powers have refrained from its use sinoe "orId War X* Bobber air-
craft bate similarly, although never so violently „ been the subject of papular
aversion* Both the implied and demonstrated consequences of mss boabardnent
of civilian populations provide adequate basis for humanitarian objections to
their utilisation* Defensive weapons have always been sore popular, political
35
than offensive weapons*
"There laay be," says -Professor Thcsmc Jicllia
m prefer not t :ailitary oa;
have." quoted ibid*, p* 302*
3k
£•£.•» Thw#e are a few things in Washington that one just does
talk about."
ae is il, biolc ;ioal, and radiological warfare*" Load from
news item, The Christian Sclera tor, Jane 20, 1961* Chesiioal, biological,
radiological warfare [b^Tz-
gases, ;orms, radiation and otlier insidious devices which in si
"f "poison gas* n
Pofspee -: wlatlcB arii s, 1 S: . iseareh, svelepRg :•» ' * •
iivalua*
aen are trad by well asanln
.
.ensive o: sive* ^ ate
ossSBsnts of Adrx irke 3
.
A swine w
. i© rifle, not upon the use to sihioh the
r e use to whieb the aarino is p - ad he is
probably offonsiv , ter*)
it is too easy, and it is wrong* to divide element
tary power i siv© and defensive categories* Part
is this true when tfee power posture Briefings, | -

Rfeiefo ha© :
.3© is that oi i ar dev...
the basis of strict &eo& 3 bat
the eyes ... i isorld* There reasons endeavor* m
»ay be si 1 loa
sent day space race poses the qut\ of prestige as opposed to
36
necessity*
M I -:aoe, irsapons xasy be subjected to decisions of a political
nature wk. avese the narrower te 1 and tactic-
de&sandiaG their product! .
Conraand Decisions
III I H i i : .
The title is perhaps i
extend to both civil and mli
military overtones*
suited to those final end uli
xtt rest. In tiie military
applicability Is
^k-/- v.o m
f ae the deserix




A cl .oability raay be found In a passage ;
the responsibility of the mmm*. -riioer for Ms aces
is absolute . • • ffee authori coajandins
casBsasurate v&th hie responsibility * • . •*'
This passage and its implications has long given pause tc
oers as jepm thoir duties and ifce dsosnss sir
1
1
ii iiiu i i
_S sho: .. b be t; s spac
a necessary one, but rather ae recognition that . lees esis
of opinion as to the validity w . the alias, ; .;s»,
j 2, 19&* ejadi s#**»Iii
' mee Monitor,,

than* -ha precepts of the other services fure of similar Import if net
exact wordiii .
In the sheer finality of the a
hea rory serious responsi s of both &e oItj
Icials vnio ahare the burdens of 'weapon selection. In such a sense it
uaed hero* to delineate the nature
and magnitude of these rospons. :js than any other able
to mind.*
Cossaand deoiaions are those of en ultimate and final nature* Thoy are
decisions which allot huge amounts of national wealth to the development and
procurement of a weapon or indicate that tfce security of the nation does not
require such a weap . are decisions of vast economic and social im-
port, are the result of all of the subsidiary decisions in the decis-
ion making process which they ultimately affirm or negate.
A review of the categories of decisions involved in weapon selection
Indicates that each individual decision eventually becomes a factor
ultimate dec . As was mentioned t any one specific as of doci-
can seldom exist lueneed by o**e or i^oro of the others. U this sense
the categories are me on of the variant factors ini
.1 dec_ >ategoriaatioc provides an t into the nature
the decision making process* oste that it is a procer
the balance of var actors. L'he eonseouenoes of "tfco dec , however,
require that the seaies be read accurately and that the weights be pr<
i.&taa%
bail respeot bfes oaataaat a
be one mam who aan make a decision... whe
can command, and os to aan

laptmr X2 c id the problou* eonfr?
the derfeenaiaatlon c xnaangarate w
aatioiml objeatiirr -.a basic beaot o ,ed Stt -"'led
: _,
• •. .: or.;,' : . . -q :ry. _ ; ;u:crrr jo :.: .•:'! L;;Otoc i: cvx.r-.: . v;..i.
lysos sal of &ll-c
La iiars*
by adequate solution In t ianted ar: ---a**/
est sast If the nation is to retail: the flexibility necessary for meet
the vary! a or political sianeuver i • "war*
In • 7 is c -id uith the selection of liie raaans of
deterrence ef an all-out isar, tfttat is, the selection of the str
rent. Mid not be viewed as a
ved war requircraaBt ply as an attempt at isolation
>ne particular aspect of the carer-all prob.'-
force and deterrence2 have been examined briefly as they relate
lom of deterrence. Thoc resuot
deoisic iide that the priiaary defense c
attack shall be placed upon a capacity for tms
ff» for a discussion c .-Masai -
2

it does not necessarily fellow thr
Its narrowest; sense is the sole e







: r .cs-;; .. - -
I. ' Ii
la t
3 prlaary torfor^u of aerial bcaha
ballistic m. .uad the Ha -
arise a combinr f the two* Admooe
divide into mar ols of .lar aaana
tion and utili' >f these tools. Respite the ' .a 5 sgarmad
iai
of the
at be taken to prement c >f the tern "aasaime reti
military doctrine mith the aor©
«' '..... ... . ' f Itt&tfltal r : :. 0? " :".--. If. .Ci-: ''"./ VO:".'"":
.sffirmtios of the theory of deterrence as the
o all-out mar say be found thr t the aaay oon-
jsional hearings as the : ' E&litar s ..^ire and defense approp-
:teresi
in report!
stress^ .:tTily the deterrent as
tic . . >!.
inn i ii i ii i maaanw I irTi i* .-jt^i-.r. i.n it, mi. i» n » i »» n in am
5
3 no inter. the possibil
aay be smiled oft ox
adv. . strat' e» however* :
offo
c,- •'•:.;;:, ,:. ill' 'or..-':. ;.."v- Hm BfaSS fcf l&m
.•
aircraft and missi theses* It is the p'.
chapter to oxamine the eharaoteristies of the 30 two ins
exaciine into the advantages and disadvantages inherent in eaehj and in this
procee I ineat© the factors I a the
popult; je to bs known as "the mix."
je of a reader v&ll bo "well ae>
vtswd t baai i.. :,ir Hm tctegoriea ot deeislons pertinent Ini swapem salo»
tion tshioh were outlined in tho preceding chapter, the factors -which these
categories represent are at all tmes active and contributory to the final
decisions which tsmst be resolve . at before undertaking this exercise it
is necessary to examine certain considerations roL
whloh must be isolated from this discussion in order that tho desired degre*
of specificity nay be maintained*
The hole of Seaborne Air ggwyr
ny years disputation has ensued between proponents power
and various other forms of military force. Perhaps no area of this controversy
lias been more bitter nor achieved more pub at between "what
for awes led the "big bomber'* and
carrier" schools of he Intensivenose of this ooafi s been
^'ihe controvori; issiles and aircraft which pervades the
hearii^s on -Wis fiscc. defense budget does not arise from the possibility
of adoption of one to the e: of the ether* but rather from differing
opinions ae to ratio and rate of eha: his in essence is the problem of
"the t,.:
enee to the m by defense officials* few examples see Senate
ilitary
:-sjyu
flection that air power enthusiasts whose -air..: 8tori
c





objectives of this iaa . .require an entry i -Is ©or;-- -
vera - a question of the role of sea poaor la any auoh
broad s fiel«S of h to b© covered within t&© \*©ry specific Halts of
I s work i
rn© It latfoms for ballistic missiles end sixt&lar
sidora-. the role of see. power w3 b» artaksa.
•j© of the neces.' ts relevance to the 5 of
national r a howov • elate
isd aircraft in the nation's deterre
la^ from aircraft carriers, wh: i :o in sous de -
a* id disadvantages of all other inarmed aire /for
—mrily in the characteristic of their basing arrangements and the technical
variations necessary to adapt them thereto* Seaborne aircraft arc a
'Two incidents «atos history stand out as olats in
the dispute between advoc t air power and sea power The i . ..oh
Barks tiie emergence of the dispute to public attention, was the si of
an © - jsa battleship h aircraft under the cccsaand of General "Billy*
Mitchell in a sontrolled tss . . .^ms in X5&1* *?&• sec
t was the fa . caatren .round the h oe*s B-
and the Bar} o&r carrier*" ot the latter incident xaorked
the tenaination of th© dispute is highly problematical although there has
• 1 military t" ; to th© appreciate.
.
of reli .0 principal weapon to satisfy the nation** " m aeeds.
;4 and an analysis of
wari.' $ to mv ar II is cental
ehell, Seversky* Theories c; "?»*•, R Sari®, ^odern
309 • For 1 .,
is evolution of air power s *f atom
.
so© Trodic, i - 21-22, -ear
|
• 51,
253 deals wiHT • *6 controversy and rolateTTF"!© sir
.
c>'
the nr manned aircraft arsenal and are supplsmsntar
stratc Lr power,
• proble ,;i in
.dequate oontinv' sitat; she
3
Weapons ;. \
Manned aircraft, specifically manned bombers » have tradl jo»-
atituted the back-bone of offensive air power.
it a way in which to reproduce by mechanioal device the capabilities
of the husaan being in direct 3 to their targets. ^Lo objective
of this search has been two-fold j irs'~* a desire to increase the probability
anotration to and aec irery upon the target, and second, an
attempt to reduce the toll of life required in an effort by a manned veh
to approach tlie target. the last several years this oapr
been achieved, or so . achieved, that Use 1 of an unmanned dell'
system and a payload of destructive power of the magnitude of nuclear votrheadi
has resulted in an "ultimate" weapon. She development of this type of weapon
lias generated a eontrover Ac relative importance of
missile, and the manned aircraft in the .-..
cent n
•l£. $2. ^aval Strata, . ^°X, ~
..jcloar ] m»
lay mind oonf ists wi
and "ballistic r. apondi




Despite the awesome poter variables m
aeient: .a endeairor, Inoiudijag war, m -im to i
a rational stratogio plan t the ©apafeir stasis •
,
ostion of haw laany of eaoh, both rel La tho
determination of t. -irstandin . I 'robleai rt - ..'.na-
tion of the eapabllities and Imitations of each system.
II. THE CASK FOR JCSSILSSS
Advantages
Tho intercontinental ball: lealie araed with a naelear warhead
lias been described as tho ultimate wer jc - Its mo«i fieant adtaKr.
lies in tho fact that thore is no presently known practical defssas© r
such a weapon. la tactical parlance, th© IC3* assures the highest
laws much in the mcmor of a projectile fired from a rifle or artilL: .}©••
In actual practice a ballistic missile receives soa«;
,
ly from
an internal inert j I 10© system, during the initial phases 01 L -,uod
booster operatic-. . J. 3 Is .asaasaary I :a> stabilise the missile and plaoe
it in th© proper orientation to assume its desired trajectory • 3uc© this
very brief piias© Is completed the ballistic msslle J fc i3 as iadepen&emt
- 1 influence as is the artillery projectile after leavl' <•••
. ,er developments in /ilssilry may s . description but it is
suf; fcly accurate for present day systems* Bid of liw©
warfare ballistic missiles hi - the main iteed the earlier ftair-
brec. .dded missiles exes r Tory specific tactical see*
10
r a die - probability of achie* a effective de-
fense against missile attack see The .enter of
search, Use ^ohns Hopkins uaiversi
.
Technology an>- - r Bapaet on United States Strategy m
Senate foreign Policy Studies, Vol. I* pp- 0*
system represents' the closest approach to dat© to a def©&s© ©gains ic
missiles. For a brj. :!©seri
ope..- &1 tea' a res sate of




weapon brings a new ana oesgj r — mr
1b v testants can engage or® another a
wy at least the weapon is » , t&e vagaries or weai
BT circus:.: eet&ve&S
ay be Maintained in instant readiness awaitir; the teuen of a button
11
to unleash it against a selected target. In tfce classical struggle of the
offense and the defe&so, the c. i i aeesis to bave outdistanced ease
12
fey a stride of great stngnitade. efeases :
basis new discoveries in the fields of science and techno log; . aberim*
11
£ne reader aust realise that the advantages feeing decer
attributable t© missiles i :<*!er optimum cc - . • A eertt- b of
generalisation is required in relv. ' abillt '-all
strategic pietur . 1 star- there are indeed
inhei
referred U. sw .• rf course prestsaes that the missile in quec
'
ises & solid propell&nt or t alicat© ©per cr-
o eesspounds of a 1 -led rocket have been aoeampllshec
.
the itrieatc nature . 3 weapon oa© wsmt realise tJ n©
ort ei lies will be under
9 cheo . i" repair and will t3
available for service* 'vise eosssscnts i the d i Ity ir
rook.. -id propell&nts illustrate the 50 use
fuel in the "set.- ^iasration* nlccJ aeh as tanas and Polaris.
Initial probla® wit lid fuels was fee difficulty in a
Burning rates in solid fuels an . . -rolled . ; ;. in thar
iapari- : . will • Le surface of rain a.
burning: rate, Adequate easting procedures Jtave now been developed*
i
The questior. icy of either the offense or l.
defense in laodem warfare Is 1
1
less one and I
tremendous force available to both sides
,
to the offensive. Nun thenaemuelnar weapons are m in an at
defence possesm sn or ninety percmt kill probability tends to lose
aifloanee, which was not the case wi1 .- ive weapons*
llent- analvces of this question are f
loo* olt * , and Brcdie, Stratej^r, p -

oneos depend upon political adroitness and the deterrence represented %
olicato balance of tei
;or advantages attend the exijploysasnt of the ballistic wAb
ad above, it racy "be smintainct ass and does not require
jtrations of an air ersw to brin^ it to life* Dspandir.
arraagcmnts of lw sites ead considerations of tac ^loyjasni
ire sissile striking foroe of a nation oould be launched sJmulteneour
:*eby accruing rasisxun utilization, of wsu
of foroo upon the target.
Mssilos and their la acilitiee are
13
sive base facilities required for Banned aircraft. " .<©d
at launching sites, extensive pro-attack preparations such ac
prcdoployraerxt, alerts and other rcve are not re
:it the. is ease with taaimed aircraft 03 con-re
roent . is^ of course mint : -ity of preparations for a s
\c, Because ass extorsive in area require-
ments than Boat other ams, hardenix, these bases is somewhat sinplcr
.
*ra'ort .« same advantages do not pertain to the oxter
n attending the co a of a missile launoi
qucntly fee question a den" a launching sit© m
.as the united States (or for that matter in a closed society s
.. ;. -oS i'' 'a, >..,;, v., beMVMTj b« vulnsri Is be aerial or satellit s oeti*
naisaanee) is debatable* For a discussion of the relationship of aer
naissanoe by the IWS, Russian sua -'--istruotxon* and
by policy, see Bees, og* cit ., -pp» 72-85
•
•
.hi oh also naturally inakes them a -se
nation shieh eiaploys a "strike first" str*i
\ is a tor. led tc r-uctio
zaake a structure raore resistant to blast or :•-. y take
forced concrete, reee fee ground, a eombinatiox
or some otker method* Bee Fos^
•
o physical e rile aaci ita
.iM render it sr . a t» a oerta:
al tfta :ites
.ially fixed. 1" iesile advocates contend that they are a sasofc cheaper
17
weapon than Manned aircraft, is also eta adequate
nunbore and • eraplaoesaent, provide the nearest
s deter
Olsadvantags*
While merits of tae ICEK'e are impressive, 1&ey are not v/ithout drasr«>
baoks* Limitations of missiles are of cot/: a strategic and a t 1 oat
nils research and experience may obviate scene of the tool: irawhe
coming of strategic disadvantages .-naps mors d Lt as t st
16
the current inter ; Is and
possibility of a railrot nutosna . Ibid *,
relative to ?olaria, and r 1 tive to I
17
The cost of a missile or ax "aft is
i •another the production line price of a particular tar a
Lo contract is ^ikest as the point of reference, or tjeV of
research and developiaent is also computed. Published figures, partic
in the press* so elr to sis of ealcu
sequently must be 3 nsiles do not r
.nine of an air crew, m total cos : naintenaneo t
is probably as 1< i^or air-
« Because of is of eo3t coop.
eralised •type of review contained . i paragraph they will aot be further
4ed to in ssmpi the advantage »8 and airorr.
aral interest, estimated oosts ares lainutosaan (in silo)
Las and W -1 first -
lion, tho latost $11 i»&liion»
noted that lenhorwor c the earl^ -
in s ^* liiorisation
..
• \<1
mfrequently are as eoc J .on ©ireuastaaoea as they arc upon the wea-
pon itael. « ''*• first and groats. :s3fbaek of the . 11® is it® iaefc
i'loxit » It is primarily a strusae « as little
value in a limited war a to eai i
war* a missile is laun-ahed it as -a recalled. ' - -
weapon and offers ro-use in a saoand a • It
is certainly .--; air super!
20
xied to aar.ned aircra eile bases nay act as
onecy missile attac - the first priority t:- res*
sor's attaa a his vii
over the heavier wi ial blow and the greater the over-all
21
Mwaatc 1'. * jit also be noted that the hardening of
:'
s term is Nan ..-...-. tar, of the jar
weapon te . am what was oo;
tion of the rod and lolea of tost eq
indicate- >ratiora particular system oenpc;
over-all weapon status.
inflexibility of the siissile probably represents ito* Jam:
the aissile-aiz-
•
ontroversy and the it aost hee
aa&xuied aircraft advoeatf. jneral Le&ay gars a very teres suaaaation of these
views is either on the
at war, or it is off J;ton and you are at peace.* See «
•ate, r we the
• inn T* ! i ii .i imm.C il w 'i tr-i-fT nwi imiiiiiiiii mmm ri.ui 1: iffci »*» iiw I 1WH1 tun .iMiawin
tabsesi ittee of wot woaittaa ex • *'•> .••-vi.s, Sited . tatei estate-.,
», La ess., . , aaate
propriatlon : a view, however, fails to take
into accc" . che»£i2*> atrategTo c stances whieh arise wh
.-Tulner
../ of t e force is attei .- . i nrd
see Kissinger, Becc
»
to air .up.ri^^ 1. <*» <,*« ^
o air in a speoifie looation while at the east* tiae de
. parti laris





(smsswwm mm wm taMmmoA for iv-.- - f . - .:..: ^,.: c v. •:. .. ••- .. .
tttd -lag targets on short notie© can be? a diJ ask*
r coraplioated if the exact location of the onerny t&
extension of tills point, one might m at the missile has practically no
capacity for socking oat "target?-. .art
back the .s of its att&c
ally, there have bean diseuecions as to the statio smture of a rda-
sile arsenal* Missile sites are Sasaobilo or at least withdrawn froia the for-
ward area, and prof "well hidden, They cannot be utilized for a shew of
roe or to stiffen the courage of a threatened ally* The j
nact of the variable and contradictory deciands of misoilo utilisation upon its
is not yet fully und<
upon miesilof b breed what 1ms eosw to be knovm as a "itaginot Line 5 '' nh.il-
osophy* *
*S'si intere jtudy which delves into the xaathsraatioal and statis-
tical aspects of missile accuracy* target bar cad else and other
pertinent aspects say be found in Eober . owers
'
rvival," Mf iniyeralty Quarterly Review
the f s work, another author lias evolved
the startl on oneray would require (at a cost
00 billion) to overcome even a "modest* retaliatory capability on fti©
countr . Is this type of sion no c ^presents an
rate calculation based upon the formulas it is of course necessary to
evaluate very oar / the int.. of the basic figures wr'.
mlas were entered* lonotholess the second artielo is valuable in that
it sheds some light c ssed and important aspe eterr
losophy* - lists ire solete Yc
XXII ,3 ), 31 ff»
'-;
,oourc: *




B strat ior/point, m eoxdisiant to all-out war whi repro-
sent* The ohalj are meant to answer my not be the one wi
enemy a threw
The foremost technical detr of the missile Ha-
te of money an-,
dr developreent and are re ly net/ and unto.
and oan be rendered impotent by eve ioet minor
Ifa» failure. lawMtMMT liquid Id propel Ian si is aritic
sl^ •::. ;. ..•-._•. - LnfluSJMM -* St '- lu.-cie ... ;*.. ./r.rc., ....). ;:.><,.
jsion of the rolia sn is that of a^
orities a^re© that a missile wil-' resently attain tt»e accuracy of a
boob launohed from a manned airoraft. rther oomplieation of the aoeuracy
factor arises from the inexact knowledge of location of some targets on the
earth's surface* There is the further limitation of warhead sise. At the
present time it is not possible to arm a ballistic missile with a warhead eg.ua
2k
Is of missile construction are classified for c





soiaa of their more obv ~;.r~
istics. cjsile is composed of four basic o sj :'sme,
sootioiij i.x>l section, and the warhead s«.
jeclianioalj pnemrsu-
end a multitude of ot "dag radio, radar s aad sioaal
self-testing . These systems may further be subdivided inc elee-
try, pj ^>rest mlvos
on lite oatal itf Imown technie . the face
verity it is not diffioult to appreciate what a truly wonderful feat
the successful £'. die rej - sueli an
st in and « by for ;,uasilos as the Secretar of the
roe has stated "Their reliability lias not been proved out wii
ree of thoroughness that has been neces >ast with other





r of course does a .1© oar;. • latter 1 .
to th© I
As they become a
on's deterrent force, observers hay© notexi
that a zmolear mrhead has never been tested in an actual lo:
--• \t is, a no proof that a nuelear warhead will survive the
;ors of launoh w ;ht. irities sask whether or not there are
icient number of these devices la existe&ee and in .ional oonfigura-
tarantec the safety of the mtion in perilous tiiaes. p
III. JEaFT
Despite tho missile's disadvantages noted above it is possible that
tho next few years nay Hark the demise of the manned aircraft as a first
deterrent weapoa, particularly in the realm of intercontinental warfare.
Advocates of the manned aircraft do not accept this prediction \
uous objection. It is possible they maintain* par rly in view of the
indc ion of th© future presently discernible., that mr.
ill cilways have a place in tho scheme of detc * lb© rt
aircraft to missiles, however, they generally concede, will probably oha
jt of the missile*
) question, and the related
Ue ©ontinuec which figured s
mis of the de
.,
urisoii
and oanned ax f the congress:
Perhaps the most 00
appears in idie . ster, ft©;; rector of
operations, VSaF, in Posture Brl©flogs
, pjp» 11$*» •
26
Ibid , Elaboration of all of the 3 mentioned in
,1 in tho citation above* There is alec
•IMNM
• principal merit of 1&s sanaad aircraft i iragt to
principal disadvantage ei* the missile. I i aircraft possesses not only
of strategic flexiM llty but a near iai
.
.ity in ocvparisos to the XCI-
Manned aircraft zaay bo launched and directed to their assigned targets
at toe first indication of possible attac I once launched they ramin
under the control of their ccer£nd agency and raay be recalled in toe event
t the attack indicators prove erroneous*-* capability significantly absent
;.ilssilos, ilie initial launch can be aiade on the authority of a local
inate oauaoader because it is not an irrsdasciablc M * o haw
a significant portion of toe retaliatory force 1 lis*
Taune to attack relieves a laodicusa of the psychol; assure on the i
vidual in -ahose hands rests the final decision to oem&fc tfee nation to -war.
If missiles are the only retaliatory system available the decision inaker has
at beat fifteen minutes to get then off the i or risk their destrao-i
le frosa an engineering standpoint the necessity of aeistainlqf an
aircrew in a Banned aircraft iasy be considered scmer. >f a penalty, that
same crew represents certain particular capabilities that
, ablo to -X fashion. Despite advance ';he fie
Kirnoticsj sciene© s >t satehed the overall potet;
of toe hucsan being * partioularl. Hie function of JwSgpesit* Cone
prose:. the sr cohering a «ldc
oai; is vhieh do net accrue to to
fhe ability of the era? to g» an evaluated reconnaissance and bat
i lli<esmient permits obtaining infermtiois is^ertsat* be farther conduct of to©
>,tf
•
air-b can also seek out & tai
location is not precise die t
ability of tho crew to n -3mt fe tar
adequate danage penaits them to divert froza tiiat ta. in al
nato objective* Th rbs a oert&ir/ tactical econoiay of to
certain circumstances could be of great importance
.
jsible
the orew to identify and engage tar .' opportunity,
large bomber aircraft are capable of oarryinr; a payload greatly in ex-
ecs o capability of s&ssiles* Hot only nay larger weapons be carried*
Is to vary the oorayosition of tho load to a racier high &egr**»
Through this oapaeity for variety it~is possible to "tailor" the load to a
particular target or series of targets, (One night note that such a
another fori: f -weapon sale on a consider?/
different level tSian has been considered here" . it laay be aetai that the
aircraft night be a laore practical end store economic means for i.
very hard and very soft targets, the fact that aircrai
erally mor& b ties is of course a factor tihioh relates
directly tc tho fc -:.; an independently isapor-
tant advanta
Manned aircraft advocc. t that they are a tried and proven
•weapon, *imt strategic and tactical doctrines have been devised and tested *
3S 3oKrsn characteristics facilitate a higfear degree of certainty in s&litary
.
to overcojae the relative disadvanv ; /stems
, aircraft pose a diffic eblam to the

69
. In conjunction ndth the missile they complicate tiie defenelTe prob-
lem in an almost exponential fashion. . ;>oardin&ted missile and aircraft
attack offers a h. i of tactical flexibility. The tr. flexibility
r increased, and the greatest disadvantage of the missile is overcome
«
if the the aircraft are xaated in what is known as a "atan-,
weapon, warrant planning emvisagos air launched ball: sh will
require tho aircraft to approach nc than 1*000 miles to the tar
A final advantage of manned aircraft lies Jb £ economics.
.Advances in consaercial aviation m ally dependc n research mdortaksn
to fulfill military require *my tiie taxpayer r '3 a remote
but important return on - waahinfit in manned aircraft, aside i
security mlue such aircraft nay pro-Ado. .This latter of course would be son**
what complicated to compute in tonus of dollars and ce
Viewed strictly as a means of weapon delivery manned alromft can be
said te suffer from -what in another context was their most significant advan-
>• From an engineering standpoint the necessity to carry a erew of human
beings imposes eevere limitations on the performance of the machine,
craft and its erew are not expendable components of tfce weapon system. The
necessity for a round trip journey requires that the portion of total we„
.rborest in t
projects. The former is an air-bros : . jnic missile of "over* g
. is presently in pro i The latter is a rocket powered
ballistic missile t&th a range of 1, ' , :id
'• Sa rings,
2, »ry of e .so, C; t Joint Chiefs of Staff, Serrleo Secretar-




jtted to fuel to le that required sickly for of the pe
-ther weight must be sacrificed to provide onTironsental and defensive
aeocaaaicdation for the crew* Perforaaaee characteristics of the vehicle swat
be restricted tc the narrow atress limits of the fr one
of these restrictions are imposed upon the ballistd a tuore
•d sense, on tiie air-brer* - sells* Consequently tise orice
of husan intelligence in the vehicle is a rather at ion in the
operational parameters of that vehicle.
l'rooor
tieal there are again f
beee is its susceptibility to enemy defenses* . \o
an ICBtf warhead, the ma
target* the defense ha
ilea, and has thereby
of all propo to t
•.. m '.i:t. for earns ..• :•• -
i_,i c r: •. o .•:. oint to fee stra i~
idable disadvantages inherent in manned al
Oomp
d aircraft is a wonderiixily lar^e and slow red
ed a new n of weapons, anti-aii*cr
for causing attri
hose known in Acrid Har II* The manned ai:
of defenses cannot compare with that of the




ration and iveness of air defenses is a
paan nay find less difficulty in isadersta
problem if he . the standpoint of saturation" of
tat Qrata - '-ef an; frm set oi ceaditiems i aefa sive ttaj
pability of procee Lfie nuraber of targets per unit of
a modern, automated system such aa SAGS this may be root.
i whan the number of tar oapabll. tshe
•am "aaturation" is achieved i -oatbara begin tc . . .'air
objective. Thus it is conceivable that a horde of the moat obsolete* lam
speed aircraft might overwhelm the most advanced defensive syatera, al
such an effort would be inhibited ta tactical imaractleality* Another
: degrade the defensive system is, to lower the sat
tion point* Increasing the speed of the attacking aircraft will aooc
est is such as to take advsx
it xaay be aaen that increasing either the numbers or
•*»*r
71
are more vulnerable 5 the air and en th€
a bomber from atomic att&ot: is saade store till ly by the physi-
cal linesiueats of the bomber in comparison to the missile, but also by tbe
muoh more extensive base complex which must remain a
airoraft oper . etn .-ore of manned aircraft also he high
oost of training the air crew and maintenance of the aircraft* The neces-
sity for tankers fur
duces tactical fleadbill .
Inherent characteristics of airoraft ana* aircraft operations usually
require extensive preparations for a leu / ;se preparations
are difficult op secret and the possibility always exists that the
activity may be detested by tits enemy. The spssd of aircraft operation also
allows considerable warning tims to the enemy. Gonsequea
do not lend themselves to surprise attack as the tem is unders
to missiles.
capabilities of the attacker may d
attack must be planned in such a imxamc as to i
gradation may also be acMe\ . decoys
cations, or any number of tactical sne* increee
altitude of the attacking, force could cause a degradetio
change in speed or numbers if the seleeted altitudes are
opsratiovial parameters of the defensive system* Even a
of a formation may exploit the sat oint where tfa
Uffsrent disposition m . Factors per
stem Itself such as operate , rate of
efficiency, and data
at psnetr- .i
effect an attempt to overwhelm at the weakest point,
is a special case, but eory still holds.) If ths
weakest point in air defense sati
- a particular characteristic or oapabi en
of lower L saturation level he will then be in a pc





«* number of air-
t* isartauasmt be Nm tefsm*
us, fire, stMsinwil eations
y all affect the saturation point,
of penetration aids are in




In & i itory attack ai o© 11
29
ole • In the
instantly ready for lauaohijig > i ts sti
. .. -
og is the best thai can be expected this can be a c limita-
tioa.
29
It. at oertain aircraft may b« capable of
taking off vdthin a certain very lis&ted mount of tiiae m reBsaaaber
that nfhile an ai iy be roady to take
v thero is a runway available for it to do so*
requirement ^ene acquire abou
.
minute between suco
of lar^e jet bonder « oral Curtis AF»
.
.ellite a. xplrj, t. 2, p

AliD CHAKAC? A WEAPON 3YST8K - * - -70
Ti che pr osis the reci
& problems collate i the s- of the weapons
tion'rj security is in part based. Various os of to
those categories represent have been d
aerlts and dis&dva. laeane for t -or-
rent power, the hare been ca?
'.i. bo,v. or33e»%«dl Mm eaekgreuafl z^.i.-jt \:.:..g:.. fcho jecisio-: :ja-<xu \u;k.
iii or
oisions on specific :' ay bo y*ff<»^t* against the be
so be described
viewed oonoern tfu
.. ..i-Iot ^o-i i.
.
v.- ::::
: j djftifio force.
-70 is
indicative of the is&sedia'ko sta^f
.eal circumstances, represent an era of ua
for bates* At a time wne
olf to the nantie o; leader has rested
for a aere decade and a half it also fixida borof
.r so 2 mitted a
lational scene* At a o advance $r
asibil

able possibilities, tbe t s aro .1 - dee be
reliance on sew a<
.
ur mse; ! the




seise Kf ^©ar :
.at
I may be found a refl &ie variety, c
.
sad




Illuatrati?© of the rapid adv y and %




exist* -70 bomber has yet Is..' line, mm
l
t« for sai •




esvisa^od by the .edy a4siaistration t s 196£ bu . Ids «£ I
be of a protot^^pe vehiele only, not the oosaplote ijso&pob systara. ^o /'5^i£ ; .





sent stage of technol
semen as the aotucl zae i
ial sense* wo must "be ©onto , of
th# «c jived and , \ihat is
the ;i-?0 and tsiat aro the capabilities it off*: r ths ir*:en«o
sums of sonsy it dezsands of the d m maker?
The
-70 represents not just a h developed aircraft rather
a "quantum jump acienoc of aerona As am writer has put it
The 3-70 is a ~ -perfonaanoe vehicle tdiioh is so
far advanced beyond -3 aircraft that to oall it an airplane is
to downgrade it semantioolly as well as tool. ally. i,
rather, a maimed missile*^
c
a this. . note a statesment by General jor
erw, »• l^i
i n I I l i i 'i ii I -
this year's bu . or
eaaople, will control the pattern and the oapabilitles of our
foj
, 3* or k years into t cure*
In a sense, it mortgages the future*
Agnate -dlita: , 19& * p« 57&*
od Missile, p. Til. Inasmuch as this work has been
aire
a word ai se oay be ap - The work, wr ft rather
X3se stjlo ca . » desc. as a s
fcation of authority or source is rare* Authoritative persons with an inti-
imto k e of ' i have been quest! «.
f the presented, and none has disputed its eBsertti&l
corr^ < hor is a see ieat tc
sine and prosusaption of adequate eesperience and rel jourees wt
to "b . roxa a 3 .
the most severe s '.sat which mi aiassc is a tend<
xtrerae - capabilities*
.
and oper I asm;.
also -ie*? of the e
.
b© reviews.
j aircraft are i
..
..:,"..-.
.v.; * !••:: ./..:. I ;.;.. :. • •: "'...IT J .'..-• ?;•>;•. .;>'.» ...•jromaasurc of 3
uprose
is advocate of t mil
follow-o.. will or atrw
. »5
rerforoaneo
. jooessary to is
of the ttieraal or "heat ban
• most sirjixfioant feature of this
thai it8 success will mark i&e can-
" an attainasnt no less, sad
3 barrier1* t* .'. the
*eral John » Hester™ IMMtMauMNWIMMI WWW -
so eallc it have a precise s<
inition inaaicadh as it is real :<nerali££






autlcal Kile s per hour ot its routine
tud© "in excoso" of 70,000 foe
causes varic all to loso sts." oven molt;*
be
soon that the heat barrier vsould vary for
bar? 9 nor© aooura afined as tdie "tre
A so sailed barrier to flight ©no
signed for subsonio speeds when it reaches transonic speedc
tqt3Q degrees o
7 discussion of speed sad altitude capabilities tho reHark-
.© feat airor
Id bo noted that the X-15 *• 8 » reeearch vohiolo and the
as:' In ishich all considerations wre sac
- saont of altitude* Neither ase aircraft wo
•jsaployed*
p, 511. The tern "Maeh" is a aeasureaent of
r anT n sci
speed of an object to the speed of s<
at the spee at
oe H» speed of 3ound and s< te spec ?r»ral
given as 7U Eton in dry air, soa level prer,
speed of tosBperaturc and ai
speed in lailes per hour whereat an ai reaches tfcs spoot.
(and ooiapresr;. .Iso varies vat
bora Mach has oons into use as a nor© loeanin

the • not only . -
an ai; .. ,
etaosphGre and in 30 doi.
alternative to the jxpansive and
jiiaraotor-
^oaontati lowed - 3&1 listi
events in its di -ho im tea*
..jtios '.vill Do
they evolvot; ponso to a ooezi; lilitary r
. y&vanoos. In this nay also vd.ll . atr&togie con-
sideration* and tha decision aaM
IX.
Inprovesaents in mechanic orally tend to
,•
. !-.;o ill: - ov:lo of reflntt .0. :. ; o ck so v device D.n"roaaDes? v>orieo-
-> more ninuto add sophic jsaente. 8ms
an upper limit oraanoe is roc
are in the nature of convenienoo and utility, rattier -than in
-aae in open; * 3 peri'
device «! as reached i - iar
>rfcrsmne© <3c are taken froza tl
.a the xaost author! ?erenee c.
oovered in the course
in the cngressional ho an







s the Lo of - device
as t&©
Ltatione inposod by "the state of the a:~
of the art risually require some radical teohnolo^ioal broakthrr.
«wplaJ in tb© direction of the approach to the pr







. II faiao o now familiar B series
j
lowed by the jet generation U7 §m iiere ivero c
Mill la porfornnnej r ,:':/:^~:. . :u. ../*. -.. >, xi: t j ..-.,- . . ;•.>: la
3tate of the art. Speak 3rally, i air*
b JbaprovGsaants in spood and
10
and load car: The last of
3d the st
•::....
-.or^.r ai so Lisutations fey eenething a£ a "brute-force" approao .
n "toe exli. possl
a bomber ma ol •
.

.5 is ahat happenec W3.it the
11first of the tr
its advantages over its
Je:
Levelojaaent of the jet engine sonde possible not
and altitude . ies ar
olaim half tee range of the 5*36 anion they supplanted
an example of tea oomprorcises aeeesaary in te<
in the engineerl > lbs reat advances in apt
wtfft aortd i •;• Uaaanlng la range
rg
or tankers for refueling. 'Hie obi
beabare -was to build one with the ec
>noe of the B-4j7 but adth esd
of eadstir , the
C ... -V'-. 3CT I:.. Sj:
enter the SAC inrent
-
.. 2U . 'Ia a* \>~: a' r-.in n i« J
e nil!
e e s eed and alt:-




y John * i :>r (eo
o, subsfe re« TThe latter work, a
comaonly ed to as Jar.
or!tat A cooplex
•
OT> * fjM** * 'interoontineiital
ylio c lit from one continent to targets on another
out or retern." .oka ap:-
.
ne is interested in an absolute si
further breaks down in its applicability to Sj e aire:
•a goo?. . note tha i a ook 3e







. > range 3
an iat
MPMBll Leal M&4NM H U > ..:-:. ,:'." development si' defensive fi . ••o >" -..>•
oraft oape,
.
-a endeavor the state of the art demoded that the -
gene of ooxapronlee be played to th< ilea indicated
eenauaaption for suetai Lt in r
as ?0 per an aironv
subsonic r »** This is unaoc to the military air
}in id
,lae, and it was
16
Si:
he greater part' bo ta .c ta
craisal subao
t« area to the
II WK
-.
: of the c rizmamts in sciene 'led
i, but it suffered fro
19
-
, go wall .re
itory * • "'' - -
1© the -
luce at t ill to
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favorablt sould lent Smpei
or all favor, / of i
under posi
than the missile might certti2
the other ha: she state of defensive system
oatc- that low-level at are th




: :.... .. .,,- ;. _
.
^.. els ill Ghwao altitude ranges.
then the B-70 has little or no advent or exi »
_
and probably to li laasmuoh as the
reasons reveal all of the information upon which tho ieeretary based hie
>,
-?u',..g. ..-, !..:..:. :! zi.u: .. icr baa been be I 1 stvate sew Hh sel/rfe
•Kit tea
or priority of each spsoifio
decision depends*
in ad to the a*
a third sot of factors--the i
.
... OS th i
: th<
:;.'. ' : .. . : :
unity to eatas&ns
. ic lar^e aircraft.
2. i1
3* B-70 development woale.
technical problems of high speed
...
•-..••
. ... t. ::";o _ :••._•• pM bt evaluated s.o or the o «
wm
.
.jly si- the oec. «e«





. r ' ;• .J . ,
: •: v.* ;;.! ""I. .:..
ti03»"
i as a reason to jur
lo mix. Bather, these ft





- v v. s.* ../ Wsntly decisive nature to avoid a final sad am
b lamsisg o; ;. .;soot letaoas ifilioii prsssal I
9 of the ;aaking process*
i . -70 pre.
r
l







,:- ,.'.... :: >.-_..': :U -.o:;-! v:-_ concern:! hli itcir, i 'Ji: the ctec-
rotary lisdted La deoi
saving of :nit of eventually ear XJ. an*
These are of course important considerations, but no r was mde of
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8 Secretary of Defense ftc advised the Congress of the d«
oisioa he had reached, he alec
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challenge some or all of these reasons, they did in great det
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and title administration and the administration's reply to these
be senmmrised* Citations will not neo« neltsde all inst
discussion of a pertieul jfc* but rather the most
tire examples uncovered*
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The Secretary of Defense pointed out that the dec: ..'id not lode
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che v—70 as a weapon systcsi a v® advisable
LLoning kad the c
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Jlarly, on t of spo low altitudes, at least out ic
neso stated fX&.i '.At the B~?0 was a &&ch 3 aircraft and not designed
id
to operate at other speeds*
Interest ms also appar the nc of other
adapted to the nissile age environs .
regard he was defi not cons -aft* 1 -',her
scaaet ;edaryH conoept.
concern of C recurred frequently nas the worri-
sob© faet that a nuolear warhead had actually never been detonated after
the teaninatlon of -M flight. There nas no palpable proof that the
nuclear device could survive the
MoMsnera assured the Congress that leading scientists in the field had
as in "beyond any reasonable doubt*1 that suocos
id be forthcoming after such a fl
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lic drorafi
while on M carry belli:-'
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acy. hile the aircraft is probably more vulnerable to detc .-\nd
as a much lower en-- ind Is
hasl -ilities, a re3 :iship in t>,\ctioal emplojisent can be seen to
laris subsssjr. opt* For a wh id»*
"Eeseareh, Test, and Evaluation, 1* pp» 36-
Senate .Ullitary Proourasic |> ]
iy be olT"
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iaes various aspects of the quo;
.atarest is that which re-Terr.; to the
action .-ass took to illustrate 1. roral or diai Mt the
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Dhlle a A 1 3d presentat the history of authorise;
Lions asasures fro*?, inc.
to the student of political science* such an involved analysis is
appropriate to this stuc. > ar par-
.
interest at isftt is in
rsanner is #iiei 'ress mnifested its reaction to the ons
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parliamentary asohani aotic
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the contradictory opinions ©bkl
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decision presented by the Secretary' of Defend
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through its chairman, stated in re. . funds for Icaa^HPaag,*
M eoiamittee has inorc- . isatio
'
by 7525 Billion* This added amount is intended only for toe
JoureeMnt p£ longer canned ai:.
Air Command*$
This statement is followed by a review of the various ad^
and disadvantages of missiles and aircraft wh -oludod those factors
already mentioned ' body of this work* 9 discussion concluded
After considering all t s, the oosanittee was
vinced that the option I ined bombers
should be preserved* In the conaaittoe's -58
is the most 1 i.ve lc oft that can be
proourod ixomodi .^
The oorsaittee sad© specific the f&cl is in no way was meant
to limit 1 s authorisation he ?c©
Aircraft a statement was ineladed that
The to :
.
rsonic strat ember » » * * Sines items still in
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to the author! sati s oozsaittee has left
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^
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;.;after referred to a& ftoport Ho* 2p? * )
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. • • the Cotaaittee ie concerned over the slow-dotm
the B»75 program and over the future of the long-ra-
bomber program generally.
Th© Iksataittee reeejaaands a total appropriation for the
production of h the s- ... ;0Q
and has so ear-iar -.-hese f ; bhe Mil* • • •
e Coranitte© feels that fire . us© of
available funds should 'be given to
program, However, it is not xaeemt V ^;.easoda^ mt
th© Defense Department should be *3.1isl?
funds provided, in th® iong«<ffaage 'bomber s «* iter other
Ions-range bombers**^
As a«y be se«a, Congress, a was t the
exercise of a considerable esc.
Defm** -with to the course of
was :©ct sayi at they did not concur with the decisions reae .
in the Bepartras:at* but that there appeared to be a good p -hat
they were correct. In case ex aowsves
3?ess was ar ating eac . allots
just its position. In a ea ears to be
k?ibid., p. 13.
. 0, Con -
,
..mt of defense Appropriatio n
.1 iilliiiin. in 11 1 rmiin ««•» - 11 ma li ft mm ' . •* *<m \m """" M". ->*»"~'«»»
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she other hand, T*aa;:
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the course of m the Defease Appropria-
tion bill, howarer, external oircuastanoes ebaatiod consider, • e sore
or less perennial *Berlin Crisis' intensity, and in the
-tids;. of this crisis, the .ussians added impetus to the aanned bomber con-
troversy. In a aassive air show i jow, the Russians travailed a vari<
new lailitary aircraft % ..dad a number of ne-ss, large jet bosabar*
Although the Air -ore© profease m the
show mhioh their 1 i te expect;..
played a lively interest in the Russian demonstration. Whether or
Russian action had my effect on the final outcoiae of the actions of
gross is agai ijlecaatical* In view of the
ms in no »ood 4itures
that the final action on Id have been the m- h or
without t tow. l\ * speculated, however, 1
demonstration certainly did not 2
ig note on the part of Congress amy be
in the Senate Appropriats saittee report on the Defense approprii
^oee Stanley Johnson, Associated Press dispatch, "Reds Show Air
wrlia," ' ost, July
10, 1961,

1, which in part stated
a decade illions
of dollars for strate »
has ,.,cac to the Strat lanned belabors.
That the sir.'.-- has worked is self-
1
iproaah
a new and relatively untri ieM c
ad advanced technology, m are told that
ballistic :. ,.les, i cl-
ient quantity, will replac
are also told by t
.
even
in the a^e of ballistic missi are still two—
liiccnbeatable , ove: the continua-
a of manned rns
o awesaae decision to ssn&it i.
second mandate for the aanne< 'she
perpetual requirement 1 . >xibilJ
* * »
:ue, no view the ;$-70 eutbaek .
concern and serious ressrv whether this
Bation can affv ondenc :>©ration~
ally untried end untested missile force.
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